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The Kurdish Regional Constitution within
the Framework of the Iraqi Federal
Constitution: A Struggle for Sovereignty,
Oil, Ethnic Identity, and the Prospects for a
Reverse Supremacy Clause
Michael J. Kelly*
The Kurd has no friend but the mountain. ...

-Ancient

Kurdish proverb

* Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Faculty Research & International
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INTRODUCTION

The Kurds have long struggled to control their own destiny.
Through centuries of cyclical oppression and autonomy, the Kurds of
northern Iraq finally united and seized an opportunity to secure a firm
legal status for their de facto state within a federal Iraqi state in the
aftermath of the Iraq War. In March 2009, I traveled to Erbil, the capital
of Iraqi Kurdistan, and consulted with the Kurdish regional parliament's
constitutional drafting committee as they finalized their new
constitution.I
As a professor of comparative constitutional and
international law, this was a rewarding experience to say the least.
But as a student of history and geography, my time in Kurdistan
opened an entirely new window of understanding. Appreciating the
culture, customs and political reality of a geographic location deepens
1. The team assembled for the trip to Iraqi Kurdistan at the invitation of the
Kurdish regional government included Dr. Aitor Bravo Esteban, professor of
constitutional law at Universidad de Deusto-Bilbao, and a Basque member of the
Spanish Parliament, and Dr. Raymond Bucko, S.J., Chair of the Anthropology
Department at Creighton University. This trip would not have been possible without the
coordination and sponsorship of Mr. Adnan Kochar, director of the Halabja CentreLondon.
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one's appreciation for the nation-building, and constitution-writing, tasks
at hand. And I certainly now take a more nuanced and informed view of

the constitutional dilemmas the Kurds face within the context of political
and security realities and against the burdensome backdrop of local
history.
The full text of the draft Kurdish Constitution is attached to this
article as an appendix. Its appearance in volume 114 of the Penn State
Law Review is the first time it has been published in English in a western
academic journal. The Kurdish regional government approved the draft
constitution on June 24, 2009, but it has yet to be voted on in a
referendum and thereby enter into force. 2 This was seen as a particularly

provocative move:
The proposed constitution enshrines Kurdish claims to territories and
the oil and gas beneath them. But these claims are disputed by both
the federal government in Baghdad and ethnic groups on the ground,

and were supposed to be resolved in talks begun quietly last month
[May, 2009] between the Iraqi and Kurdish governments, sponsored
by the United Nations and backed by the United States. Instead, the
Kurdish parliament pushed ahead and passed the constitution, partly
as a message that it would resist pressure from the American and
Iraqi governments to make concessions.
The Obama Administration dispatched Vice President Biden to
advise the Kurds to back down from their confrontational stance with
Baghdad.4 Biden was able to secure a promise by the Kurds not to put
the draft constitution to a referendum yet.5 Tensions remain high as of
this writing, and political posturing will likely intensify as the date for
withdrawal of U.S. forces nears.
This article offers an analysis and critique of the document itself,
but also sets the stage for an understanding of where the Kurds have
come from and where they are headed within a federal Iraqi state.
Special focus is dedicated to key sovereignty, rule of law and oil wealth
issues as well as comparative take-offs for other ethnically distinct
entities that enjoy greater or lesser degrees of autonomy within their own

2. Sam Dagher, Kurds Defy Baghdad,Laying Claim to Land and Oil, N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/10/world/middleeast/

10kurds.html? r-2&ref-world.
3. Id. ("American diplomatic and military officials have said the potential for a
confrontation with the Kurds has emerged as a threat as worrisome to Iraq's fate as the
remnants of the insurgency.").
4. Id.
5. Sam Dagher, New Kurdish Leader Asserts Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2009,

available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/29/world/middleeast/29kurds.html?scp=
1&sq biden%20kurds&st-cse.
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federal structures. Because of the unique argument postulated to force a
reverse supremacy dynamic in the vertical federal interplay between the
Kurdish regional and Iraqi federal constitution concerning oil and gas
development, a separate section is dedicated to that discussion.
When undertaking an exercise of this sort, it is important to be
mindful of the reality of what is achievable given the society and what is
written in the constitutional document. The bridge between the written
word and what actually happens can sometimes be long-or even
unattainable. Yet to the extent that the Kurdish regional constitution
reflects the aspirations of the Kurdish people, as opposed to a wholly
hortatory document like the Soviet constitution, which was beautifully
written, then the Kurds have made a start of it. And their openness to
input from many quadrants is encouraging.
I.

THE KURDS: A STATELESS PEOPLE

Known by the ancient Sumerians as the Karda and by the
Babylonians as the Qardu, the Land of the Kurds stretches across the
northern part of what was known historically as Mesopotamia. Today,
the 74,000 square miles of mountainous and heavily forested terrain that
"Kurdistan" covers encompasses southeastern Turkey, northwestern Iran,
northern Iraq and northeastern Syria-an area the size of France. The
Tigris and Euphrates rivers originate in the rugged mountains of
Kurdistan, their life-giving waters cascading down to the lower plateaus
of the Fertile Crescent.
From before the time of Xenophon (427-355 B.C.), this land was in
the possession of the Kurds, who consider themselves indigenous to the
region. Kurds are an Aryan people and an ethnic group distinct from the
Turks, Persians and Arabs, although the majority of Kurds share the
Islamic faith of those populations. The Kurdish language, customs,
traditions and internal tribal structures are also distinct. Numbering
roughly 30 million, the Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the world
without a state. Instead, they have been incorporated as minority
populations within the larger surrounding states. 7
Virtual independence, coupled with statelessness, has been the fate
of the Kurds through history. Wedged between the larger powers of
Persians, Assyrians and Babylonians, the Kurds were constantly pressed
into service by the rulers of various empires up to and including that of

6. HENRY D. ASTARilAN, THE STRUGGLE FOR KIRKuK: THE RISE OF HUSSEIN, OIL,
AND THE DEATH OF TOLERANCE IN IRAQ 64, 145 (2007).
7.

NADER ENTESSAR, KURDISH ETHNONATIONALISM 2-3 (1992).
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the Greeks, which later gave way to their provincial incorporation into
the Roman Empire.
From the demise of Byzantium to rule by Arabs under the Caliph of
Baghdad, the Kurds enjoyed a degree of autonomy which eventually
gave way to virtual independence in the second half of the 1 0th Century
as Kurdistan was shared among the five largest Kurdish principalities:
the Shaddadid, Rawadid, Hasanwayhids, Annazids, and the Marwanid.
However, one by one, these principalities were annexed by the Seljuk
Turks. Their greatest leader, Saladin, ruled during the Ayyubid period,
but they later came under the influence of the Mongols during the 1 3th
Century, when Marco Polo made his famous trek across Asia to visit the
court of Kublai Khan, meeting and writing about Kurdish customs along
his winding journey eastward.9
Eventually, as their Mongol overlords receded back into Asia
proper, the Kurds began re-forming independent principalities, only to be
subsumed once again by foreign powers. The Ottoman Empire came to
control much of Kurdistan early in the 1 6th Century as Sultan Selim I
defeated the Persian Shah Ismail in 1514. As a security measure, the
Persians forcibly resettled hundreds of thousands of Kurds away from
their new borders with the expanding Ottomans and into the interior of
Persia. Removal of the Kurds from the Anatolia region was traumatic
and devastating. Ismail's successor, Shah Tahmasp I, systematically
destroyed Kurdish villages and the countryside as his forces slowly
retreated eastward year by year from the advancing Ottomans.' 0
In 1609, the Kurds rose up against their Persian masters, ruled by
Shah Abbas I. They rallied around a fortress called Dimdim by Lake
Urmia in what is now northwestern Iran. The Kurdish resistance, led by
Amir Khan, capitulated after a year-long siege led by the Persian grand
vizier Hartem Beg, who eventually captured the fortress and massacred
the defenders. Shah Abbas then ordered the general massacre of Kurds
in the surrounding cities and resettled Turkish tribes into formerly
Kurdish areas."
The Kurds lived divided under Persian and Ottoman rule for
centuries thereafter. Following the Russo-Turkish War of 1828, Kurdish
uprisings over the next three decades were put down, Kurdish governors

were replaced with Turkish ones, and garrisons were strengthened within

8. Maria O'Shea, Tying Down the Territory: Conceptions and Misconceptions of
Early Kurdish History, in THE KURDs: NATIONALISM AND POLITICS 123-25 (Faleh A.
Jabar and Hosham Dawod eds., 2006).
9. Id
10. Id
11. Id.
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Kurdish towns. Separatist activity continued at a low level up through
the First World War. 12
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire upon its defeat by the Allied
powers in the First World War offered the Kurds another chance at selfrule. Kurdish representatives lobbied the victorious Allies for an
independent state to rise from the ashes of the rapidly disintegrating
empire. Representatives of the crumbling Ottoman order signed the
Treaty of S~vres with the Allies in 1920, which formally dismembered
the old empire into "mandatory" states under the supervision of Allied
powers, as well as independent states. Kurdistan was assured of
independence at last.' 3
The method of triggering the creation of a Kurdish homeland was
nuanced in the Treaty of S~vres, as the section on Kurdistan reveals:
SECTION III. KURDISTAN.
ARTICLE 62.
A Commission sitting at Constantinople and composed of three
members appointed by the British, French and Italian Governments
respectively shall draft within six months from the coming into force
of the present Treaty a scheme of local autonomy for the
predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the
southern boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter determined, and
north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia, as
defined in Article 27,11 (2) and (3).
If unanimity cannot be secured on any question, it will be referred by
the members of the Commission to their respective Governments.
The scheme shall contain full safeguards for the protection of the
Assyro-Chaldeans and other racial or religious minorities within
these areas, and with this object a Commission composed of British,
French, Italian, Persian and Kurdish representatives shall visit the
spot to examine and decide what rectifications, if any, should be
made in the Turkish frontier where, under the provisions of the
present Treaty, that frontier coincides with that of Persia.
ARTICLE 63.
The Turkish Government hereby agrees to accept and execute the
decisions of both the Commissions mentioned in Article 62 within
three months from their communication to the said Government.

12. Id.
13. MICHAEL J. KELLY, GHOSTS OF HALABJA: SADDAM HUSSEIN & THE KURDISH
GENOCIDE 14 (2008).
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ARTICLE 64.
If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty
the Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall
address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a
manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas
desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers
that these peoples are capable of such independence and recommends
that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute
such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these
areas.
The detailed provisions for such renunciation will form the subject of
a separate agreement between the Principal Allied Powers and
Turkey.
If and when such renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised
by the Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an
independent Kurdish State of the Kurds inhabiting that part of
Kurdistan which has hitherto been included in the Mosul vilayet.14
Although the United States was not a party to the peace settlement
with Turkey, as the U.S. and the Ottoman Empire had not been at war,
President Wilson was regarded by the other Allied Powers as a player not
to be ignored during discussions for a Middle East settlement.
Specifically, Wilson was accorded the task of demarcating the
boundaries of a new state for the Armenians, which was provided for in
Articles 88-93 of the treaty. That Wilson took into account the Kurdish
population neighboring a new Armenian state, and the potential for
creation of a new Kurdish state, is revealed in his diplomatic note to the
Allies explaining his rationale for the Armenian frontiers:

The White House
Washington
November 22, 1920
Mr. President: By action of the Supreme Council taken on April 26,
of this year an invitation was tendered to me to arbitrate the question
of the boundaries between Turkey and the new state of Armenia. ...
[T]he scope of the arbitral competence assigned to me is clearly
limited to the determination of the frontiers of Tukey and Armenia in
the Vilayets of Erzerum, Trebisond, Van and Bitlis. With full
consciousness of the responsibility placed upon me by your request, I
have approached this difficult task with eagerness to serve the best

14.

Treaty of Sevres art. 62-64, Aug. 10, 1920.
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interests of the Armenian people as well as the remaining inhabitants,
of whatever race or religious belief they may be, in this stricken
country, attempting to exercise also the strictest possible justice
toward the populations, whether Turkish, Kurdish, Greek or
Armenian, living in the adjacent areas....
The conflicting territorial desires of Armenians, Turks, Kurds and
Greeks along the boundaries assigned to my arbitral decision could
not always be harmonized. In such cases it was my belief that
consideration of a healthy economic life for the future state of
Armenia should be decisive. Where, however, the requirements of a
correct geographic boundary permitted, all mountain and valley
disticts along the border which were predominantly Kurdish or
Turkish have been left to Turkey rather than assigned to Armenia,
unless trade relations with definite market towns threw them
necessarily into the Armenian state. Wherever information upon
tribal relations and seasonal migrations was obtainable, the attempt
was made to respect the integrity of tribal groupings and nomad
pastoral movements.
From the Persian border southwest of the town of Kotur the boundary
line of Armenia is determined by a rugged natural barrier of great
height, extending south of Lake Van and lying southwest of the
Armenian cities of Bitlis and Mush. This boundary line leaves as
part of the Turkish state the entire Sanjak of Hakkiari, or about onehalf of the Vilayet of Van, and almost the entire Sanjak of Sairt. The
sound physiographic reason which seemed to justify this decision
was further strengthened by the ethnographic consideration that
Hakkiari and Sairt are predominantly Kurdish in population and
economic relations. It did not seem in the best interest of the
Armenian state to include in it the upper valley of the Great Zab
River, largely Kurdish and Nestorian Christian in population and an
essential element of the great Tigris river irrigation system of Turkish
Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. The control of these headwaters should
be kept, wherever possible, within the domain of the two interested
states, Turkey and Mesopotamia. For these reasons the Armenian
claim upon the upper valley of the Great Zab could not be satisfied.
The boundary upon the west from Bitlis and Mush northward to the
vicinity of Erzingan lies well within Bitlis and Erzerum vilayets. It
follows a natural geographic barrier, which furnishes Armenia with
perfect security and leaves to the Turkish state an area which is
strongly Kurdish....
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I have the honor to submit herewith the text of my decision.
-Woodrow Wilson' 5
The Treaty of S~vres, however, was rejected by the Turkish
nationalist movement which was waging a military campaign against the
occupying Allied forces under the direction of Mustafa Kemal Pasha,
later to be known as Atattirk-the founder of a new secular Turkey.
Atatirk was a battle-hardened veteran of the Galipoli campaign that
repulsed repeated Allied attempts at landing on the narrow peninsula.
This had earned him grudging British respect. Before Kurdistan could be
founded, Atattirk had parlayed vital support from the Soviet Union into a
successful consolidation of the countryside and a political assault on the
weakening Sultan that led to the military expulsion of Allied troops,
abolition of the monarchy, and establishment of the Republic of
Turkey. 16
In 1923, the Turks of the fledgling Republic under Atattirk signed a
new treaty with the Allied powers, who were not prepared to redeploy
into Anatolia to fight another war-especially since Atattirk was by then
cutting deals with Lenin in Soviet Russia. By that time, a smaller
version of Armenia had been converted into a Soviet Republic. The
Treaty of Lausanne, recognizing the new political situation in the region,
revoked the promise of an independent Kurdistan and Armenia in
exchange for ceding Turkish claims to Cyprus, Iraq and Syria and
agreeing to honor 40% of Ottoman debts.

15. Letter from President Woodrow Wilson to the Supreme Council of the Allied
Powers (Nov. 22, 1922), in 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1920 790
(1936).
16. The historian Margaret McMillan notes:
The great line of sultans that had produced Suleiman the Magnificent had
dwindled to Mehmed VI. His main achievement was to have survived the rule
of three brothers: one who was deposed when he went mad; his paranoid and
cruel successor, so fearful of enemies that he employed a eunuch to take the
first puff of every cigarette; and the timid old man who ruled until 1918.
Mehmed VI was sane but it was difficult to gauge whether there were any ideas
in his bony head. He took over as sultan with deep misgivings. "I am at a
loss," he told a religious leader. "Pray for me."
The power of the throne, which had once made the world tremble, had slipped
away. Orders from the government, reported the American representative,
"often receive but scant consideration in the provinces and public safety is very
poor throughout Asia Minor." Although Constantinople was not officially
occupied at first, Allied soldiers and diplomats "were everywhere-advising
and ordering and suggesting." Allied warships packed the harbor so tightly that
they looked like a solid mass. "I am ill," murmured the sultan, "I can't look out
the window. I hate to see them." Atatuirk had a very different thought: "As
they have come, so they shall go."
MARGARET MACMLLAN, PARIS 1919 369 (2001).
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Consequently, the Kurds were victims of global, as opposed to
regional, politics. Abandonment of promises made by Western powers
in the Treaty of S~vres was, from the perspective of the Kurds, a painful
double-cross. It would not be the last time they were abandoned by the
West. The old Ottoman province of Mosul, rich with oil fields, was
attached to the new state of Iraq along with the provinces of Basra and
Baghdad. The Kurds who lived under Ottoman rule for so long were
thereby partitioned between Turkish and Arab rulers. Kurds in Iran
remained under the rule of the Persians.17
The post-World War I settlement remains the geographic fate of
greater Kurdistan.18 Each of the areas of Kurdistan have suffered
different degrees of repression from their foreign masters, perhaps
mostly at the hands of the Turks and Arabs. Iraqi Kurdistan has over
time come to enjoy the greatest level of autonomy amongst the larger
Kurdish populations, but the journey to that level of autonomy has been a
long and difficult one. The struggle within Iraq began shortly after the
war in 1918. It continues to the present day.' 9
On December 1, 1918, during a meeting in Sulaimeniya with the
British Commissioner for Mesopotamia, Kurdish leaders demanded
support for a united and independent Kurdistan under British protection.
Frustrated, Shaikh Mahmoud Barzanji, a Kurdish leader based in
Sulaimaniya, formed a Kurdish government and led two revolts against
British rule. It took authorities two years to put down his uprisings. The
first revolt began on May 22, 1919 with the arrest of British officials in
Sulaimaniya, and it quickly spread to Mosul and Erbil. Afterward, the
British exiled Mahmoud to India. 2 0
In July 1920, tribal leaders called again for independence of
Kurdistan within the British mandate. British objection to Kurdish selfrule was driven by fear that granting it would encourage the Arab areas
of Baghdad and Basra to follow suit, thereby threatening British control
17.

KELLY, supra note 13, at 17.

DENISENATALI, THE KURDS AND THE STATE (2005):
The transition from empire to state . . . distributed the Ottoman Kurdish
communities, territories, water resources, and petroleum deposits of the Fertile
Crescent into geographically contiguous, sovereign territories. After the 1920
Treaty of S6vres suggested Kurdish statehood and the ratification of the
Lausanne Treaty in 1923, which rescinded the offer, the Ottoman Kurdish
regions were legally subsumed into different administrative and political
systems in Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. Kurdish communities no longer shared a
common political center but became linked to separate governments as
peripheral border regions.
Id. at 26. The distribution of Kurds today is 43% in Turkey, 31% in Iran, 18% in Iraq,
and 6% in Syria. Id. at n.1.
19. DAVID MCDOWALL, A MODERN HISTORY OF THE KuRDS 87 (1997).
20. Id.
18.
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over all Mesopotamia. In 1922, Britain restored Shaikh Mahmoud to
power, hoping that he would organize the Kurds to act as a buffer against
the Turks, who had territorial claims over Mosul. Mahmoud instead
declared a Kurdish Kingdom with himself as the king, though he later
agreed to limited autonomy within the new state of Iraq. In 1930,
following Iraq's admission into the League of Nations, Mahmoud
instigated a third uprising which was suppressed with British air and
ground forces.2 1
After a military coup in Iraq in 1958 led by Abdul Karim Qasim, a
clan leader named Massoud Barzani saw an opening for the Kurds and
returned from exile to establish his own political party, the Kurdistan
Democratic Party, which was granted legal status in 1960. Soon
afterward, Qasim attempted to turn Baradost and Zebari tribes against
Barzani. In June 1961, Barzani led his first revolt against the Iraqi
government with the aim of securing Kurdish autonomy. Qasim's
government was not able to subdue the insurrection. The Ba'athist coup
against Qasim in February 1963 resulted from his inability to deal with
the Kurds forcefully. A ceasefire with the Kurds in 1964 caused a split
22
among Kurdish radicals and traditional forces led by Barzani.
Barzani agreed to the ceasefire and expelled the radicals from the
party. Seizing the opportunity of a crack in Kurdish unity, the central
government in Baghdad moved against the Kurds militarily once again.
This campaign failed in 1966, when Barzani's forces defeated the Iraqi
Army near Rawanduz. Subsequently, the government in Baghdad issued
a 12-point peace program. The program was not implemented, however,
because of a bloodless coup by the military in 1968 which installed the
Ba'athist general Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr. The new regime began a fresh
campaign to end the Kurdish insurrection, however the campaign was
stalled in 1969 as an internal power struggle in Baghdad and tensions
with Iran began to mount. Relenting to Soviet pressure to come to terms
with Barzani, the al-Bakr government entered into a broadened peace
plan providing for greater Kurdish autonomy within Iraq. The plan also
granted Kurds representation in government bodies.23

21. AARON S. KLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH POLICY INTHE ARAB WORLD: THE
CAIRO CONFERENCE OF 1921 168 (1970). By 1927, the Barzani clan had also become

vocal supporters of Kurdish rights in Iraq. In 1929, the Barzanis demanded the formation
of a Kurdish province in northern Iraq. Emboldened by these demands, in 1931 Kurdish
representatives petitioned the League of Nations to set up an independent Kurdish
government. Under the pressure from the Iraqi government and the British, the most
influential leader of the clan, Mustafa Barzani was forced into exile in Iran in 1945. He
later relocated to the Soviet Union. KELLY, supra note 13, at 17.
22. KELLY, supra note 13, at 18.
23. Id.
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Simultaneously, the Iraqi government embarked on an Arabization
program in the oil rich regions of Kirkuk and Khanaqin of Iraqi
Kurdistan. Importing and resettling Sunni Arabs into the region became
a priority for the Sunni-dominated minority government in Baghdad. In
1974, the government began a new offensive against the Kurds, pushing
them closer to the border with Iran. Iraq negotiated with Iran to end
Iranian support for the Iraqi Kurds in exchange for the settlement of
border territory in Iran's favor. The 1975 Algiers Accords memorialized
this agreement, and Tehran cut supplies to the Kurdish movement.
Support of the Kurds from the United States was also withdrawn. 24
Barzani, nevertheless, fled to Iran with many of his supporters.
Others surrendered en masse and the resistance to Baghdad's control was
quashed. The Iraqi government steadily extended its control over the
northern region and advanced its Arabization program. In response to
the government's repopulation policies, renewed clashes between
Kurdish guerillas and Iraqi troops occurred in 1977. To punish the
Kurds, Saddam's government leveled 600 Kurdish villages and forcibly
removed 200,000 Kurds to other parts of the country in what was the
beginning of a massive internal Kurdish diaspora.2 5
Although the Iraqi Kurds had been severely mistreated under
successive Arab regimes, this mistreatment was nothing compared to
what they would experience under the iron fist of Saddam Hussein, who
engineered his control over the government and Baath party completely
by 1977 and eased al-Bakr from the presidency in 1979. Saddam
repeatedly played Kurdish factions off one another, with Iran serving as a
constant supporting actor, and irritant to Saddam, in the melodrama.
When significant numbers of Kurds sided with Iran during the 1980-88
Iran-Iraq War, Saddam was provided the perfect pretext to commit
genocide against them, which he did during 1988.26
The Kurds, in turn, took the opportunity to rise up against Saddam
after he was weakened in the wake of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. That
24. McDOWALL, supra note 19, at 323-340.
Besides making it difficult for Kurds in Kirkuk to hold title to their property,
the governorate was rearranged to ensure an Arab majority. Towns with a
heavy Kurdish majority, for example Kalar (30,000), Kifri (50,000), and
Chamchamal (50,000), Tuz Khurmatu (80,000) were removed from Kirkuk and
allocated to Slaymaniya, Diwaniya or the new province of Salah al Din. Other
distasteful measures included financial rewards to Arabs who took Kurdish
wives, a deliberate encouragement of ethnic assimilation, the transfer of
Kurdish civil servants, soldiers and police out of Kurdistan, the removal of
Kurdish faculty from the new university in Sulaymaniya and the Arabizing of
some place names.
Id. at 340.
25. Id.
26. KELLY, supra note 13, at 20-32.
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uprising, however, was short-lived and the Kurdish ranks were crushed
by Saddam's military. This prompted western power to step in once
again, this time to protect the Kurds, and allow them to create a
functioning Kurdish society in the north of Iraq largely freed from
Baghdad's control.
A.

Iraqi Kurdistan

Iraqi Kurdistan exists today in a de facto sense, but struggles to
exist in a de jure sense. The area itself became essentially independent
of Saddam's regime after the 1991 uprising. Thanks to the U.S.-BritishFrench enforced "no fly zone" established in the wake of the first Gulf
War, Iraq's Kurds were able to go about their own business
unencumbered by Baghdad's retention of nominal and geographic
27
sovereignty.
In March of that year, in northern Iraq, ethnic Kurd separatists
launched a rebellion against the Baghdad regime of Saddam Hussein.
The Iraqi army responded with brutal suppression, compelling ethnic
Kurds to flee northward toward the mountains bordering Turkey,
creating a humanitarian emergency. In April 1991, the United States
launched Operation Provide Comfort, a military intervention justified
on humanitarian grounds. The United Nations (in Security Council
Resolution 688) quickly urged its members to contribute to the
humanitarian effort, and a coalition of states then helped the United
States to protect the Kurds, establish refugee camps, provide
humanitarian aid, and assist with resettlement. The United States
also spearheaded a no-fly zone over the Kurdish area of Iraq,
conducting missions from bases in Turkey to patrol and shoot down
any Iraqi aircraft operating in that airspace. The intervention thus
provided not merely emergency humanitarian aid, but long-term
military assistance that shifted the balance of power within Iraq,
effectively rewarding the Kurds with political autonomy that also
promoted their human rights.2 8
Freed from Saddam's repressive hand, the Kurds could move
forward politically and economically-providing their own social
services, healthcare and education. Tension between the two main
political parties, which played out in a four-year bloodbath, undermined
much of this progress.
Massoud Barzani's Democratic Party of
Kurdistan (KDP) and Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
27. MICHAEL M. GUNTER, THE KURDS OF IRAQ 87-95 (1992); MICHAEL M. GUNTER,
THE KURDISH PREDICAMENT INIRAQ: A POLITICAL ANALYSIS 67 (1999).
28. Alan J. Kuperman, HumanitarianIntervention, in HUMAN RIGHTS: POLITICS &
PRACTICE 338 (Michael Goodhart ed., Oxford 2009).
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(PUK) essentially divided the country among themselves and went to
war. The stand-off that emerged has since evolved into a tacit
understanding of shared power and engendered, if not cooperation, then
toleration and a stable and secure political and economic environment.
B.

Stabilityfrom PoliticalEquilibrium

Disunity among Kurds exists within the nation-state elements as
well. In Iraqi Kurdistan, the fault-line is political, not religious. Indeed,
the overwhelming majority of Kurds are nominally Sunni Muslim. The
two main political parties that fought so bitterly in the mid-1990s
reached a mutual accommodation to divide their geographic control of
Iraqi Kurdistan. As Figure 1 depicts, PUK headquarters is located in
Sulemaneyah and KDP headquarters is located in Erbil. The parties also
control security within their own zones and their respective external
borders. This is particularly beneficial to the KDP because the surcharge
they are able to collect on cross-border trade between Turkey and Iraqi
Kurdistan is substantial.
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vigure I: Internal ironticai Ivision or Iraqi

(source: CIA, 2003)

The history of this political divide is an important backdrop to the
constitution-making that is now taking place in the Kurdish National
Assembly. Despite a common goal of independent statehood, the 22
million Kurds living in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey are hardly unified.
Several political factions exist that are not necessarily coterminous with
current international frontiers. 2 9 The political factions stem from groups
of clans and tribes that banded together over time in the face of adversity
from foreign rulers. Because of this structure, there is inherent rigidity
29. Gareth Stansfield, Finding a Dangerous Equilibrium: Internal Politics in Iraqi
Kurdistan-Parties, Tribes, Religion and Ethnicity Reconsidered, in THE KURDS 271
(Faleh A. Jabar & Hosham Dawod eds., 2003).
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among Kurdish political factions-very few people move between
parties.
Since they are driven by family allegiance, the parties
crystallized long ago.
The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) was founded in 1945 from
the Komala nationalist movement, a grouping of urban upper-class Kurds
around Mahabad, Iran. Led by Mustafa Barzani, the KDP briefly
established a Kurdish Republic in 1946 in northern Iran alongside the
Azerbaijani Republic. The Western Allies viewed these new republics as
extensions of Soviet influence and supported the Shah's military
campaign against them. When Soviet troops withdrew from Iran in May,
1946, the Shah was free to renew Kurdish suppression. 30
Barzani fled to the USSR, where he remained in exile for eleven
years. During this time, other KDP branches formed in Turkey, Iraq and
Syria, eventually absorbing elements of the original party. Most of the
leaders were drawn from the educated Kurdish cadres and exhibited
strong communist sympathies. Barzani came to head the Iraqi KDP in
1964 and consolidated his base of support there. Over the next ten years,
Barzani garnered power among aristocratic loyalists, established the first
peshmerga military forces, and engaged in brief struggles with Baghdad
alternating with deals for more or less power-depending on the shifting
political sands that year. Independence, however, remained elusive.31
Frustrated at the lack of progress on nationalist issues, Jalal
Talabani, one of the disgruntled members of Barzani's politburo, left
with his supporters in 1975 to form the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK). The PUK's initial purpose was to resume the armed struggle
against Baghdad for Kurdish independence. Military success brought
about three-fourths of Iraqi Kurdistan under PUK influence. But
progress against Baghdad ground to a standstill in the run-up to the IranIraq War.
During the 1980s, Iran and Iraq both sought to play the KDP and
PUK against one another with some success. Saddam was effective in
creating jahsh militias-small armed Kurdish groups loyal to Baghdad,
that could be deployed in Kurdistan to undermine defenses, collect
intelligence, cajole conscripts to fight in the south against Iran, and
prepare the way for Iraqi military incursions. However, by July 1987,
Tehran had convinced the PUK and KDP leadership to form a united
front against Saddam in exchange for Iranian support.32
Saddam responded shortly thereafter with his Anfal offensive to
wipe out Kurdish resistance, consolidate Baghdad's control over Iraqi

30.
3 1.
32.

KELLY, supra note 13, at 48.
Id.
MCDOWALL, supra note 19, at 343-55.
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Kurdistan, and Arabize certain strategic regions of the north. The
destruction that reigned down on the Kurds in 1988 was horrific. Over
180,000 Kurds perished in gas attacks, conventional military assaults,
round-up and detention in concentration camps, and exposure to weather
and starvation at the hands of Saddam's forces.
Upon Saddam's defeat in the Persian Gulf War, both the PUK and
KDP moved to retake control of Iraqi Kurdistan, inviting jahsh
militiamen back into the Kurdish ranks under a general amnesty. In the
wake of Saddam's renewed suppression following the 1991 uprisings,
the Kurds withdrew north of the 3 6 th Parallel, where U.S. and British air
contingents had established a no-fly zone to protect the Kurds from
Saddam's planes.34
From 1994-1998, the KDP, under the leadership of Massoud
Barzani, and the PUK, under Jalal Talabani, fought a bloody war for
power over northern Iraq. The KDP controlled the northern portion of
Iraqi Kurdistan, with its political base in Irbil, while the PUK controlled
the southern portion, based out of Sulaymaniyah. However, after a U.S.brokered deal in September 1998 that brought both parties together, the
factions began focusing on developing their respective portions of the
Kurdish economy and opening cross-border links with their Kurdish
cousins in Iran and Turkey. 36
After the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq, Kurds were able to
shift their regional government into a strong bargaining position relative
to the defeated Sunni Arab and newly liberated Shi'a Arab elements.
Although the political logistics proved challenging, the ultimate bargain
put both PUK and KDP members into a Kurdish regional assembly under
an Alliance List (a form of unity government), appointed the KDP's
leader, Massoud Barzani, head of the regional government, and sent the
PUK's leader, Jalal Talabani, to Baghdad as president of the national

government. 37
No significant opposition parties have formed to challenge the
status quo between the PUK and KDP. A small group known as the
Kurdish Islamic Union (KIU), led by Salahuddin Muhammad
Bahauddin, formed as Kurds were wrestling with the establishment of
the Kurdish regional government. But that party's headquarters was
torched in December 2005, and the KIU accused regional KDP officials
of orchestrating the attacks; KDP denied any involvement.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

KELLY, supra note 13, at 20-32.
Id.
GUNTER, THE KURDISH PREDICAMENT, supra note 27, at 67-109.
McDOWALL, supra note 19, at 368-95.
Id.
Id.
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The story of Kurdish political infighting in Iran is similar to that in
Iraq. The KDP's struggles in Iraq during the 1960s and 1970s were the
focus of Barzani's efforts. In a deal with Tehran for support to
destabilize northern Iraq, Barzani commanded the remnants of the
Iranian KDP ("KDPI") to cease their struggle within Iran so that the Iraq
front could be developed. Most followed these orders, but a splinter
group broke off and formed the KDP in Iran Revolutionary Committee
(KDPI/RC). This group was crushed by the Shah's forces in collusion
with Barzani.39
In Turkey, the Kurdish nationalist movement has a distinctly
militaristic bent. The Kurds have waged a guerrilla insurgency in
southeastern Turkey since the 1920s. By 1939, the Turkish government
had forced down a series of revolts and thousands of "problem Kurds"
were shipped to western Turkey. Things were quiet until the 1960s when
Kurds in Turkey, emboldened by the Kurdish uprisings in Iran and Iraq,
took up arms once again. Cycles of repression followed as unstable
governments rose and fell during a period of coups in Ankara for the
following two decades.4 0
The Turkish government's repression of Kurds living in Turkey was
based somewhat on an idealized notion of what it meant to be
"Turkish"-that only Turks lived in Turkey and the Kurds were in fact
Turks:
Thus the "inferiority" of Kurds (as represented in their attachment to
reactionary politics, their tribal customs, and their regional
backwardness) did not exclude their "perfectibility" as Turks, if only
they would submit to the nationalizing process. But as their true
identity was Turkish anyway, the cultural genocide mooted by the
civilizing process was not one that necessitated their physical
destruction (contrary to what transpired in the Armenian massacre in
the years before the Republic's founding). Kurds could become
Turks by becoming modem ... 41
In 1980, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) was formed by Abdulla
Ocalan, a young radical, who began to stir up nationalist sentiment. By
the mid- 1980s the PKK carried out military attacks with support from the
government in Syria-a government which sought to keep Turkey
39. KELLY, supra note 13, at 12-19. Subsequently, a new group formed, the
Revolutionary Order of Toilers (Komala), which organized the peasantry and women.
Since the 1980's, Komala has offered itself as an alternative to the elitist KDPI and
continuous battles have been fought since then. Although both groups work for more
autonomy within Iran, these efforts fall short of a call for complete independence.
40. Id.
41. CHRISTOPHER HousTON, ISLAND, KURDS AND THE TURKISH NATION-STATE 104
(2001).
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destabilized. There are no other Kurdish factions within Turkey to
challenge the authority of the PKK; thus, their situation is unlike the
divided Kurdish political base in Iran and Iraq.42
Ocalan led the PKK's insurgent operations until his capture in 1999.
He was ejected from his base in Syria the year before under intense
pressure, and the threat of invasion, by Turkey. He fled to Russia, which
refused to harbor him, then to Greece, which had supported his
movement within Turkey, but was not allowed to stay. From there he
flew to Italy and was held by Italian authorities after Turkey formally
requested his extradition. However, Italian law forbade extradition of
individuals to countries that had the death penalty. Since Turkey still
used capital punishment at that time, Ocalan was released and
disappeared-to much Turkish consternation.43
Eventually, Ocalan ended up in Africa, hidden by the Greek
government in its Kenyan embassy. This was not the best hiding place,
as U.S. intelligence agents were everywhere in Nairobi, investigating the
al-Qaeda bombing of their embassy. U.S. agents tipped off Mossad
(Israeli intelligence) to Ocalan's whereabouts and this information was
relayed to Turkey, Israel's military ally in the Middle East. Turkish
agents then picked up Ocalan as he was being transported from the Greek
embassy to the Nairobi airport on February 15, 1999.44
Over the years, tensions have flared between the PKK and Barzani's
KDP faction, which controls the Turkey-Iraq border. Barzani has
criticized the PKK for establishing military bases inside Iraqi-Kurd
territory to launch attacks into Turkey. On a policy basis, the PKK
rejected the KDP/PUK decision to seek regional self-government within
a federal Iraq. The PKK believes any independent Kurdish state should
be a homeland for all Kurds.45

42. MCDOWALL, supra note 19, at 397-454.
43. Michael J. Kelly, Case Studies "Ripe" for the International Criminal Court:
PracticalApplications for the Pinochet, Ocalan, and Libyan Bomber Trials, 8 MSU J.
INT'L L & PRAC. 21, 30-35 (1999).
44. KELLY, supra note 13, at 50. Ocalan is currently incarcerated as the only inmate
in a Turkish prison on the island of Imrali in the Sea of Mamara. The PKK quieted its
military struggle during the ensuing years under pleas from Ocalan-induced by the
Turkish government. Although Ocalan received the death penalty for his part in the
insurgency, he most likely will not be executed due to a moratorium on capital
punishment issued by the Turkish government, which is a candidate for membership in
the European Union, where execution is banned. Turkey Abolishes Death Penalty, CNN
World, Aug. 3, 2002, available at http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/08/03/
turkey.death.pen/.
45. Miron Varouhakis, Fiasco in Nairobi: Greek Intelligence and the Capture of
PKK, 53 STUD. INTELLIGENCE: J. AM. INTELLIGENCE PROF'L, No. 1 (Mar. 2009) available
at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csistudies/studies/vol53nol/fiasco-in-nairobi.html.
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Unity in purpose but disunity in methodology has stymied Kurdish
efforts to build a homeland since the post World War I settlement of the
1920s divided them as minorities in disparate states. Whether a
consolidated effort within Iraq can achieve a gravitational center for
Kurdish aspirations remains to be seen. Neither Turkey, Syria nor Iran
wish to see an independent Kurdish state emerge from the chaos in Iraq.
Consequently, those states will likely seek to keep the Kurdish political
factions as disunited as possible for the foreseeable future.
KURDISH AUTONOMY UNDER THE IRAQI FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

II.

With an independent Kurdish state off the table, the Kurds of Iraqi
Kurdistan settled for autonomy and regionalism within a federal
structure. The Constitution of Iraq was negotiated in 2005 and adopted
by referendum on October 15 of that year. It was a vigorously negotiated
document characterized by notable tension between Kurds and Shia on
key points, with the United States occasionally weighing in to break
impasses.46
Prior to the negotiation and adoption of the 2005 "permanent" Iraqi
constitution, an interim constitution was negotiated and adopted under
the auspices of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) that governed
Iraq in the aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of the
country. Known as the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), this
interim constitution formed the basis of the permanent constitution to
such an extent that there was very little room for maneuver between the
two iterations. 47
The Kurdish factions were united during the TAL negotiations, 48
and consequently dealt from a position of strength. Thus, while his staff
was left to contend with the Arab factions, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer,
head of the CPA, went to Erbil to negotiate directly with the Kurds. This
parallel track opened a key avenue of power to the Kurds, of which they
wasted no time taking advantage. 49 Not only did the Kurds have
Ambassador Bremer on their home turf, but those identified as
46. See generally Ashley S. Decks & Matthew D. Burton, Iraq's Constitution: A
DraftingHistory, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (2007).
47.

ANDREW ARATO, CONSTITUTION MAKING UNDER OCCUPATION: THE POLITICS OF

IMPOSED REVOLUTION IN IRAQ 63 (2009).

48. Id. at 135.
49. Id. at 135-45. See also James Glanz and Walter Gibbs, American Advisor to
Kurds Stands to Reap Oil Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2009, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/ll/12/world/middleeast/12galbraith.html
("In
the
constitutional negotiations, he [Galbraith] helped the Kurds ram through provisions that
gave their region-rather than the central Baghdad government-sole authority over
many of their internal affairs, including clauses that he maintains will give the Kurds
virtually complete control over all new oil finds on their territory."). Id.

THE KURDISH REGIONAL CONSTITUTION

2010]

727

accompanying him had little expertise in constitutional or federalism
issues.so
The Kurds, on the other hand, presented a united Barzani-Talabani
front backed by a team of Western constitutional law experts led by Peter
Galbraith and Brenden O'Leary.5 Comparatively, it was no surprise that
Kurdish positions should have advanced over the split Sunni/Shia Arab
positions as the TAL came together. This pre-figured to a decisive
Kurdish advantage as the derivative Iraqi constitution was drafted:
[M.] Barzani ...

dominated the process of making the final

constitution. And it is true: the Kurds kept everything the TAL gave
them, made new gains with respect to a further weakening of the
jurisdiction of the federal government and the ultimate disposition of

Kirkuk as well, and even managed to gain a kind of mediating
position with respect to some issues such as the question of Islam and
the state.52
What emerged was a federation. Article 1 establishes Iraq as a
federal entity.5 3 Like the United States, where each state has its own
state constitution that exists under the federal constitution, Kurdistan is

entitled to its own regional constitution. But The Kurdish regional
constitution must exist within the framework of the Iraqi federal
constitution-which the Kurds helped craft to their advantage. Several
specific articles of the Iraqi constitution bear mention here. Article 13
functions as a supremacy clause:
Article 13:
First: This Constitution is the preeminent and supreme law in Iraq
and shall be binding in all parts of Iraq without exception.
Second: No law that contradicts this Constitution shall be enacted.
Any text in any regional constitutions or any other legal text that
contradicts this Constitution shall be considered void.54
Thus, the provisions of the Kurdish constitution cannot directly
countermand those of the Iraqi constitution. That said, to the extent that
the Iraqi constitution is silent on a matter, regional constitutions adopted
under it may control a given issue or area of authority. The federal

50. ARATO, supra note 47, at 142.
51. Id. at 313 n.30.
52. Id. at 232.
53. See CONsT. OF IRAQ art. I ("The Republic of Iraq is a single federal, independent
and fully sovereign state in which the system of government is republican, representative,
parliamentary, and democratic, and this Constitution is a guarantor of the unity of Iraq.").
54.

CONST. OF IRAQ art. 13.
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government is, in fact, granted exclusive power in only nine discreet
areas:
Article 110:
The federal government shall have exclusive authorities in the
following matters:
First: Formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representation;
negotiating, signing, and ratifying international treaties and
agreements; negotiating, signing, and ratifying debt policies and
formulating foreign sovereign economic and trade policy.
Second:
Formulating and executing national security policy,
including establishing and managing armed forces to secure the
protection and guarantee the security of Iraq's borders and to defend
Iraq.
Third: Formulating fiscal and customs policy; issuing currency;
regulating commercial policy across regional and governorate
boundaries in Iraq; drawing up the national budget of the State;
formulating monetary policy; and establishing and administering a
central bank.
Fourth: Regulating standards, weights, and measures.
Fifth: Regulating issues of citizenship, naturalization, residency, and
the right to apply for political asylum.
Sixth: Regulating the policies of broadcast frequencies and mail.
Seventh: Drawing up the general and investment budget bill.
Eighth: Planning policies relating to water sources from outside Iraq
and guaranteeing the rate of water flow to Iraq and its just
distribution inside Iraq in accordance with international laws and
conventions.
Ninth: General population statistics and census.
Articles 112 through 114 establish other areas in which the federal
government and regional governments share power. These include oil
and gas development, antiquities, customs enforcement, water resources,
education, environmental policy, electric energy distribution and health
policy. 56 Analogous to the 10 th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
Article 115 of the Iraqi constitution functions as a savings clause:

55. CONST. OF IRAQ art. I10.
56. See CONsT. OF IRAQ art. 112-14.
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All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal

government belong to the authorities of the regions and governorates
that are not organized in a region. With regard to other powers
shared between the federal government and the regional government,
priority shall be given to the law of the regions and governorates not
organized in a region in case of dispute. 57
On the surface, these provisions appeared enticing enough to induce
buy-in to a unified federal state by the disparate Kurdish, Shia Arab and
Sunni Arab factions, which is what they were intended to do. Instead
of integrating the ethno-religious factions within Iraq into a party
structure, 59 the decision was made by the framers to divide political
power among the groups geographically. 6 0 Now that a region is
establishing itself legally within Iraq, these provisions come to life and
must be given meaning. How far can the Kurds go along the road of
autonomy? Legally? Politically?
The Iraqi constitution, and the constitutional court created to
interpret it, are not yet old enough to indicate whether flexibility or
rigidity will come to rule the day. Indeed, in vibrant democracies such
questions are sometimes never resolved. Arguments over whether a
founding document is static or evolutionary in nature are still had on a
yearly basis in the United States Supreme Court between Justices Breyer
and Scalia-and the U.S. constitution is over 200 years old.6 1 Even the
struggle concerning federal versus state control over legislative areas
continues.62 Thus, an initial take on constitutional interpretation is not
necessarily dispositive.
Whether the federal constitutional court in Iraq will enjoy the
degree of judicial independence necessary to chart its own course is also

CONST. OF IRAQ art. 115.
58. Paul R. Williams and Matthew T. Simpson, Rethinking the PoliticalFuture: An
Alternative to the Ethno-Sectarian Division of Iraq, 24 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 191, 230,
241 (2008).
59. John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal
Consociationas PoliticalPrescription,5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 670 (2007).
60. Nicole B. Herther-Spiro, Comment, Can Ethnic Federalism Prevent "Recourse
To Rebellion? " A Comparative Analysis of the Ethiopian and Iraqi Constitutional
57.

Structures, 21 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 321, 341-44, 349-50 (2007).
61. See, e.g., C-SPAN, Constitutional Conversation (C-SPAN television broadcast
Apr. 21, 2005), available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/186408-1; Audio tape:
U.S. Association of Constitutional Law: Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court
Decisions, held by American University, Washington College of Law (Jan. 13, 2005),
available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1352357/posts.
62. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005) (on the supremacy of federal
legislation over conflicting state legislation under the commerce clause on the question of
intrastate medicinal marijuana production and possession in California).
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an open question.63 On the role of Islam and the judiciary, the
experiences of the role of Islam in the constitutions of Egypt and Iran,
and the courts that effectuate that role, offer divergent examples.6
Much controversy accompanied the adoption of Iraq's new
constitution on questions of religious freedom, 6 6 women's rights67 and
human rights/minority rights.6 8 On religion, which affects the other main
areas of concern, the Iraqi constitution states in Article 2 "Islam is the
official religion of the State and is a foundation source of legislation"
and, moreover, "[n]o law may be enacted that contradicts the established
provisions of Islam." 69 Thus, questions arise as to whether Islam will
control or only be one source of legislation, serve as a break on
parliamentary legislation, undermine democratic principles and
individual rights, or unduly empower imams over elected politicians.70

63. Matthew T. Simpson, Iraqi High Court Authority: A State-PracticeReview of
the Source of High Court Authority and an Assessment of 2005 Iraq Constitution,
HOBART & WILLIAM SMITH CS. PuB. AFFs. J., Nov. 2007, available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-106110 1.
64. See generally Forrest Hansen, Note, The Iraqi Constitution: Upholding
Principles of Democracy While Struggling to Curtail the Dangers of an Islamic
Theocracy, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 256 (2006) (The role of Islam is central to the
Iranian constitution and the courts that interpret it, as opposed to the constitution of Egypt
and their more secularly oriented courts).
65. See generally Noah Feldman and Roman Martinez, ConstitutionalPolitics and
Text in the New Iraq: An Experiment in Islamic Democracy, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 883
(2006).

66.

Nathan J. Brown, Commentary, The Final Draft of the Iraqi Constitution:

Analysis and Commentary, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE (2005), available at

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/FinalDraftoflraqiConstitutionl.pdf; Nina Shea
and John F. Cullinan, Constitutional Concerns:Religious Freedom Is At Risk in the New
Iraq, NAT'L REV., Aug. 29, 2005, available at, http://www.nationalreview.com/
comnment/shea200508290941.asp.
67. See generally Hallie Ludsin, Relational Rights Masquerading as Individual
Rights, 15 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 195 (2008) (Focusing on the danger that law
based on religion poses to women, specifically the fact that because the constitution
protects religion above all else, women will be unable to enforce any human rights
violations and discussing the theory that although everyone is guaranteed certain
individual rights under the constitution, women only have those rights if someone with
whom a woman has a close personal relationship with gives them permission based on
the fact that personal status is derived from religious law, which also means that the
human rights safeguards built into the constitution do not really protect rights at all.).
68. See generally Mohamed Y. Mattar, Unresolved Questions in the Bill ofRights of
the New Iraqi Constitution: How Will The Clash Between "Human Rights" and "Islamic
Law" Be Reconciled in Future Legislative Enactments and JudicialInterpretations?,24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 601 (2006); Makau W. Mutua, The Iraq Paradox: Minority and
Group Rights in a Viable Constitution,54 BUFF. L. REv. 927 (2006).
69. CoNsT. OF IRAQ art. 2A.

70. See generally Larry CatA Backer, God(s) Over Constitutions: Internationaland
Religious Transnational Constitutionalismin the 21s' Century, 27 Miss. C. L. REv. 101
(2008) (offering examples of variant outcomes in the Islamic world).
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Some argue that the government must make laws with two value
systems in place-one of religion and one of democracy, and that this is
possible because the reference to Islam in the Iraqi constitution is
specifically to Islamic law as opposed to Islam itself.71 Others fear that
the seeds of theocratic rule by the Shia majority have been sewn. It is
widely known that the Shia-dominated Maliki government is beholden to
one of the Shia clerics in Iraq-Muqtada al-Sadr.72 The senior Iraqi Shia
Imam, Ali al-Sistani,n keeps the militant strains of Sadr and his
followers in check by dent of age and honor.74 After the Maliki
government was installed, Sadr was recalled to Tehran for further
training when his armed militias laid down their arms to support the
federal government. Again, once U.S. forces withdraw, all bets are off
71. See Intisar A. Rabb, "We the Jurists":Islamic Constitutionalism in Iraq, 10 U.
J. CONST L. 527, 536-38 (2008).
[T]he two clauses on "Islam". . . in Article 2 incorporate Islamic law rather
than Islam itself. The constitutional text indicates that this is the case in two
ways-through one negative implication and one positive one. First, "Islam" is
too vague a notion to serve as a source of legislation because the term connotes
a vast religious tradition with a considerable amount of internal diversity. As a
religion, Islam refers to a belief system that in its simplest form entails three
core tenets-belief in God, belief in the Prophet, and belief in the day of
resurrection-and encourages the establishment of a just order. The religion
can therefore provide little legislative guidance, unless the Constitution
contemplates legislative regulations on belief. It does not. The Constitution
provides for freedom of religion and belief in both inter- and intra-religious
terms. Perhaps foreshadowing the sectarian strife that now threatens the very
viability of the Iraqi state, the Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis
of religion or belief with respect to the many factions into which Iraqis may
divide: religious, sectarian, or with regard to legal school (madhhab), belief, or
opinion. It further prohibits groups and even tendencies that advocate accusing
Muslims of infidelity to the faith. The negative implication is that Islamic law,
rather than Islam, is what the Constitution invokes as a basis for legislation.
Second, and more pointedly, is the positive implication of the non-contradiction
clause in its use of two terms that connote law: "thawdbit" and "ahkam."
Thawabit (singular thabit) is discussed in classical works, but does not play a
rule of central importance in articulations of legal theory. With its appearance
in modern documents of law and state, contemporary jurists have revisited the
term, attempting to link it to the classical tradition. For example, the head
mufti of Egypt, 'All Jumu'a, explains that thawabit are agreed-upon Islamic
legal rules that apply to all Muslims, regardless of time or place. Ahikcm
typically refers to legal rules in both classical and modern usage. Together,
these two terms affirmatively indicate that the Iraqi Constitution has
incorporated Islamic law-rather than the religion of Islam.

PA.

Id.
72. ARATO, supra note 47, at 246-47.
73. Id. at 59.
74. Ayatollah Reaches Peace Deal with al-Sadr, CNN World, Aug. 27, 2004,
availableat http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/08/26/iraq.main/index.html.
75. Babak Rahimi, The Rise of Ayatollah Moqtada al-Sadr, FOREIGN POLICY, July
27, 2009, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/07/27/the-riseof
ayatollah muqtada al sadr?page=full.
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as to what shape the regime in Baghdad will ultimately take and what
influences will be brought to bear.
As for the Kurds, they received a bit of an insurance policy by way
of Article 141 in the Iraqi constitution, which protects the laws of
Kurdistan and carries forward existing laws in the Kurdistan region,
thereby protecting most pre-2005 Kurdish legislation from being
steamrolled by the federal constitution:
Legislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan since 1992 shall
remain in force, and decisions issued by the government of the region
of Kurdistan, including court decisions and contracts, shall be
considered valid unless they are amended or annulled pursuant to the
laws of the region of Kurdistan by the competent entity in the region,
provided that they do not contradict with the Constitution.
III. THE KURDISH REGIONAL CONSTITUTION
The Kurdish regional government in Erbil and the Iraqi central
government in Baghdad are discovering firsthand the structural tensions
built into a federal system. Such tensions, and the accompanying debates
over balance of power, are new to the Middle East-where monarchy
and dictatorship are the historical norm. How this relationship will play
out, or even survive, remains to be seen.
Indeed, the recent feuding between the president of the Kurdish
regional government, Massoud Barzani, and the prime minister of Iraq,
Nouri al-Maliki, forebodes a potentially rocky turn of events once U.S.
forces withdraw from Iraq in 2010.n7 That Prime Minister Maliki is
frustrated over his lack of physical control of Iraq's borders in the north
is an understatement.
When my team flew into Erbil from Vienna, we were processed by
Kurdish customs officials, received by the Interior Minister's
representatives, and never encountered an Iraqi federal official. Indeed,
the only Iraqi federal troops that we came across were at the annual
genocide memorial service in Halabja. That was also the only place we
met U.S. troops. The border areas with Iran that we passed were staffed
with Kurdish PUK peshmergajust as the Turkish border is staffed with
KDP troops.
As Maliki has attempted to assert federal authority, Barzani has
bristled and denied Maliki that power-for both political and economic
reasons. With Arab Iraq still occupied by U.S. forces, the lid has not
76. CONsT. oF IRAQ art. 141.
77. See Ned Parker, Kurdish Leader Talks of Authoritarian Drift in Iraq, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2009, at A4, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/1 1/world/fgiraq-barzani 11.
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blown completely off this dispute. But Barzani is preparing. Before we
arrived, the Kurdish regional government received a shipment of three C130 cargo plane loads of small arms and ammunition from Bulgaria
without securing permission from Iraq's central government." Erbil is
readying itself for anything Baghdad might try once the U.S. pulls out of
Iraq-including a military assault.79
So with that general political background, how will a new Kurdish
regional constitution legitimize the government in Erbil while
simultaneously holding back the natural accretion of power to Baghdad
in a unified country? Some would say that's a false question. They
argue that the real agenda of the Kurds is independence, and anyone who
reads the Kurdish constitution with a clear eye, would see that it is
intended to eventually achieve that aim.so President Barzani has not
gone out of his way to quash that notion. 1
The constitution has gone through various iterations but has
basically hewed to the underlying text attached in the appendix to this
paper.
A.

Broad Outlines & Critiques

Like most new constitutions of the late 2 0 th and early 2 1st Centuries,
the Kurdish constitution begins with a considerable preamble designed to
set the provisions that follow into an historical context, 82 several articles
of preliminary understandings and assertions, a section on governance, a
laundry list of individual rights (including various bodies to carry those
rights into effect), a financial section, and final provisions. The format
78. Ernesto Londoio, Kurds in N. Iraq Receive Arms from Bulgaria, WASH. POST,
Nov. 23, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/200 8/11/22/AR2008112202297.html.
79. See Phil Sands and Nizar Latif, Talk of War as Kurdish Tension Increases, THE
NATIONAL, Aug. 1, 2009, available at http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbes.dll/
article?AID=/20090802/FOREIGN/708019857.
80. Parker, supra note 77; Paul Christopher Weber, Iraq is a HardPlace, GLOBE &
MAIL, Feb. 27, 2009, at 38. An unofficial poll conducted in 2005 determined that 98.5%
of Iraqi Kurds would prefer an independent state. ROBERT OLSON, THE GOAT AND THE
BUTCHER: NATIONALISM AND STATE FORMATION IN KURDISTAN-IRAQ SINCE THE IRAQI

WAR 219-220 (2005).
81. Parker, supra note 77 ("[Barzani] warned that if the [Iraqi] prime minister
continued to try to make changes to the constitution and alter the spirit of post-Hussein
Iraq, the Kurds might consider declaring independence. 'That's the bridge we will have
to cross when we come [to] it,' he said. 'Even in the preamble of the constitution, it says
very clearly [that] adherence to this constitution is a precondition to preserving the unity
of Iraq."').
82. The Preamble is the functional equivalent of America's Declaration of
Independence in that it amounts to a catalogue of complaints and justifications,
beginning, "We, the people of Iraqi Kurdistan have been oppressed for decades ..... "
See CONSTITUTION OF IRAQ Pmbl.
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has become quite standard for modem constitutions. Aside from the
document's structure, many points emerge that are worthy of note in
addition to the unresolved issues concerning the city of Kirkuk and
control of the region's oil, discussed separately in sections B and C
below.
Security, for instance, is a very tangible and real concern for the
Kurds. The current political stasis between the two dominant parties is
replicated in the security situation, which may, in fact, undergird the
political stasis. Our team noted during our visit that the KDP and PUK
each control their own peshmerga soldiers, checkpoint guards, border
guards and intelligence agents. Consequently, there are not one, but two
defense ministers and two interior ministers within the regional
govemment-one from each party.83
The new constitution changes this arrangement by consolidating
control of all these units in single ministries for each portfolio and
placing ultimate authority for them in the regional president. 84 The fact
that the Kurdish region has a standing military consolidated under the
president certainly plays into the argument that Iraqi Kurdistan is
Political sub-units within
ultimately angling for independence.
federations are not typically armed. Moreover, under Article 104(13),
the president has the power to deploy the Kurdish military beyond the
Kurdistan region with the approval of parliament. The constitution is
ambiguously silent on whether that deployment power extends only to
other areas within Iraq or whether the president can send his forces
abroad.
The placement of territorial concerns at the beginning of the
constitution belies the understandable obsession the Kurds have with this
question. Article 1 acknowledges the existence of the Kurdistan region
"within" the federal Iraqi state.86 Article 2 demarks the borders of that
region (specifically including Kirkuk) and invokes Article 140 in the
Iraqi federal constitution to return areas formerly considered to lie within
Kurdistan. And Article 3 prohibits creation of a new region within the
Kurdish region-so nothing can be carved away from the Kurds.
A particularly strong sovereignty clause was written into Article 4
that poses a clear challenge to any unbalanced federal relationship

83. Philip Shishkin, Kurdish Rivalries Play Out on Cellphones Providers' Battle,
Soon to Ease, Points to Underlying Lack of Unity in Iraq Region, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24,
2007, at A4
84. CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 13, 99, 104, 113.
85. CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 104(13).
86.
87.
88.

CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 1.
CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 2.
CONsT. OF KURDISTAN art. 3.
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Baghdad might attempt to impose. Aside from the subject areas listed in
Article 110 of the Iraqi federal constitution that grant primary authority
to the federal government, "the constitution and laws of the Kurdistan
Region are more sovereign and supreme than those passed by the Iraqi
government. . . "89 This assertion is buttressed by a choice of law
provision that requires Kurdish courts to follow Kurdish law in the event
of a conflict with other laws. 90 This emphasis amounts to a reverse
supremacy clause and is a key component in the Kurdish gambit to assert
control over much of the oil and gas in Kurdistan.
Moreover, the Kurdish region arrogates to itself the power to enter
into agreements with foreign entities on non-Article 110 subjects, and
maintains the power to sign deals with foreign entities on Article 110
subjects if the federal government consents.9 1 This, likewise, becomes
important in the context of concluding oil exploration and development
contracts.
These strong sovereignty clauses are particularly muscular in light
of the opt-out provision contained in Article 8. Here, the right of the
Kurdish people to self-determination is invoked-and not the
autonomous kind, rather the full Wilsonian ideal. Thus, the Kurdish
region freely associates with the other regions in the Iraqi federation, but
reserves the right to leave the federation if the central government either
departs from the federal model or abandons the constitutional principles
of democracy and human rights, or if the central government fails to
effectuate Article 140 in the federal constitution. 9 2
Interestingly, the Kurdish constitution places much less emphasis on
Islamic identity when juxtaposed against the Iraqi constitution. Whereas
the Iraqi federal constitution places Islam in Article 2 as the official
religion of Iraq and "a foundation source of legislation," 93 Islam is not
even addressed in the Kurdish constitution until Article 7, which
recognizes "the Muslim identity of the majority of the people of
Kurdistan." 94 Article 7 is also not as heavy-handed about Islam as a
source of law; saying instead that "the principles of Islamic Shari'a is
[sic.] one of the sources of legislation."95
Indeed, the chair of the constitutional drafting committee, Furset
Ahmad Abdulla,9 6 and his chief counsel, Tarik Jambaz, repeatedly re89.
90.
91.

92.
93.
94.

CoNsT.
CONST.
CONsT.
CONST.
CONST.
CONST.

OF KURDISTAN
OF KURDISTAN
OF KURDISTAN
OF KURDISTAN
OF IRAQ art. 2.
OF KURDISTAN

art. 4(1).

art. 4(2).
art. 9.
art. 8.
art. 7.

95. Id.
96. Chairman Abdulla's biography, http://www.kurdistanparliament.org/default.
aspx?page=Parliamentmembers&idm=2312 (last visited on Dec. 23, 2009).

736

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 114:3

iterated to my team during our consultations that Shari'a was meant to be
only one of many sources of law even though no other ones were
identified in Article 7 out of deference to the religion. Moreover,
Chairman Abdulla asserted that Shari'a would not be used in Kurdistan
as a bludgeon to keep women down as it has been in Arab societies.
He specifically pointed to various provisions of the constitution that
guaranteed women's rights such as equality with men, prohibition of
gender discrimination, guaranteed civil and political rights covered by
the constitution and international treaties to which Iraq is a party, the
removal of "all obstacles which hinder their equality in cultural, social,
economic and political lives . . ."97 and the commitment to provide

shelters for the protection of women "who have lost family security
because of social reasons."9 Additionally, a minimum of 25% of the
seats in the regional parliament, local councils and municipalities are
reserved for women. 99 This goes a bit farther than the Iraqi constitution,
which provides that the "elections law shall aim to achieve a percentage
of representation for women of not less than one-quarter of the members
of the Council of Representatives" 100-the lower chamber of the Iraqi
parliament.
These statements were reassuring, but had to be taken with a grain
of salt given the conservative nature of even a nominally-Islamic and
tradition-bound tribally-based society. As recently as the last decade,
female genital mutilation (FGM) was widely practiced in the Kurdish
region and rightly condemned by the international community.io' But we
were assured by the chair as well as by political officers from the KDP
and PUK that this practice had stopped and those who persisted in
undertaking it would be prosecuted.
Although we pushed for inclusion of language in the constitution on
this issue as a key backstop-explaining that legislation can be changed
more easily than constitutional provisions, we were told that all segments
of Kurdish society had to buy in to the document in order for it to be as
widely embraced as possible and get the government off to a strong start;
thus belying some resistance by unknown elements. We were fully
aware throughout our experience that we were talking to people with
their own agendas, and this problem is endemic to any exercise of this
sort.
97.
98.
99.
100.

CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 21.
CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 49(4).
CoNsT. OF KURDISTAN art. 23(2).
CONsT. OF IRAQ art. 49(4) (emphasis added).

101. Amit Paley, For Kurdish Girls, a Painful Ancient Ritual; The Widespread
Practiceof Female Circumcision in Iraq's North Highlights The Plight of Women in a
Region Often Seen as More Socially Progressive,WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2008, at A9.
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Yet the Kurds have made significant strides in the consultation of
minorities within Kurdistan in the drafting of this constitution and in
lodging significant protections for them in the document. Kurdish
political leaders represented passionately to us and to other western
academics consulting with them on this process that minority protections
would move forward stridently and they will be an example for the rest

of the Middle East.10 2
Article 18's equality clause lays the groundwork for this. It protects
all citizens from discrimination based on "race, gender, color, language,
social background, religion, sect, economical and social condition, or
political and intellectual affiliations."os Given the conservative nature of
the society, sexual orientation is naturally missing as a protected class.
Nevertheless, the classes protected are in fact more expansive than one
finds in other Middle Eastern constitutions. The key ethnic minorities in
Kurdistan are Arabs and Turkomen-which are covered by the general
equality provisions as well as language rights. 104
The key religious minorities are Christians and Ezidis. The
Christian community is an amalgam of Chaldean, Assyrian and
Armenian, os while the Ezidi community (possibly numbering up to
300,000) adheres to an old religion blending elements of Islam, Judaism,
Christianity and Zoroastrianism.106 Their religious freedom rights are
specially protected in Articles 7 (the same article that identifies Islamic
law as one source of legislation), 65 (protection for places of worship)
and 124 (internal judicial control over their own internal spiritual and
family matters). 0 7
Although not included in the draft constitution annexed to this
paper, Chairman Abdulla's committee said that a new article was to be
inserted guaranteeing the minority representation arrangement in the
regional parliament that is already in play. Under this system, five seats
are set aside for Christians (Chaldeans and Assyrians), one for
Armenians, and five for Turkomen. Ezidis are included in the 100 seats
assigned for ethnic Kurds. Minority rights are also respected in the

102. See Brendan O'Leary, The Kurds: A Ghostly and EmbarrassingNation, Book
Review, GLOBE & MAIL, May 17, 2008, at D3.
103. CONsT. OF KURDISTAN art. 18.
104.

CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 14.

105. Abeer Mohammed and Neil Arun, Kurdish Sanctuary for Christian Refugees,
Press Release, Kurdish Regional Government, Nov. 27, 2009, available at
http://www.krg.orglart icles/detail.asp?lngnr=12&smap=02010200&rnr-73&anr-32664.
106. Michiel Leezenberg, PoliticalIslam Among the Kurds, in THE KURDS 205-206
(Faleh A. Jabar and Hosham Dawod, eds. 2006).
107. CONsT. OF KURDISTAN arts. 7, 65, 124.
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criminal law provisions, which reflect provisions that are standard in
most modem constitutions and do not bear mention here. 0 8
The civil liberties section, however, is noteworthy. The simple
assertion in Article 59 that "Everyone has freedom of speech and self
expression" is left surprisingly unqualified;' 09 especially in light of the
qualification in the following article on freedom of the press, assembly
and strikes, "as regulated by law.""o Despite this potential disconnect,
the spirit of Article 59 appears to control life in Kurdistan, as far as we
could tell in our travels. My team conducted at least six magazine and
newspaper interviews, three television interviews and one radio
interview-all with our own translator (not one imposed by the
government).
Moreover, all topics were open for vigorous debate, including the
constitution, human rights, women's rights, the role of Islam in a
progressive society, national elections in neighboring Iran, the influence
of Iran in Iraq and Kurdistan, corrupt business practices by the Kurdish
political parties, and even the legitimacy of the regional government.
Indeed, the television production by KNN-TV (Kurdish National News)
was in the format of a crossfire debate-encouraging and provoking
argument.'"
We were all in agreement that nowhere else in that part of the
world, except Israel, would we be invited to engage in such freewheeling discussions challenging the government. Thus, Kurdish society
seems farther ahead in this regard than its neighbors. We certainly
would not have engaged in that level of free speech in Damascus,
Riyadh, Tehran or even Baghdad. Yet all the discussions were among
men, not women, and all the men were Kurdish, not Arab, or some other
ethnicity.
Moreover, it was our distinct impression that, as a stark
counterpoint to this whiff of freedom, the Kurdish regional government
maintains strict control over groups of citizens forming into civil society
units. Although Article 64 commits to enhance the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), they are regulated by law,112 may

108.
109.

CoNST. OF KURDISTAN arts. 24-42.
CONsT. OF KURDISTAN art. 59.

110. CONsT. OF KURDISTAN art. 60.
111. As a counterpoint to this experience in 2009, see Freedom of the Press 2008,
Freedom House Draft Country Reports, at 101 (April 29, 2008): "Extrajudicial means of
harassment and intimidation of independent journalists also increased in the Kurdistan
region over the last couple of years, with several editors of independent publications such
as the Hawlati being jailed and resigning from their posts over threats of imprisonment
for publishing articles critical of the KRG."
112.

CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 64.
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not be affiliated with foreign political organizations, 13 and must adhere
to the human rights and principles contained in the constitution.1 14 In
practice, this means that NGO's must register with the governmentwhich apparently only grants recognition sparingly. An international
observer has noted that "independent civil society organizations are few
and far between. Most organizations remain under the yoke of the two
major political parties; they are often run by senior party members and
serve as extensions of the political parties."'

5

This assertion was borne out during a rather uncomfortable lunch
with a leader of the KDP's parliamentary caucus, Aram Rasoul Mamand,
and two Kurdish activists who were trying to start an affiliate of
Chatham House in Erbil, but could not get recognition from the
government despite multiple attempts. This particular group is a Britishbased international NGO that promotes free speech and free exchange of
democratic ideals.
That group's experience would appear to violate Article 71, which
provides that the freedoms articulated in the constitution cannot be
restricted by law if "those restrictions and limitations do not affect the
essence of the right or freedom to an extent that a society built on the

just, free and democratic principles accepts them."ll 6 Consequently, if
the operation of the NGO registration provisions in Kurdistan
undermines the spirit of the freedoms protected in the constitution, then
legislative adjustments are in order once this constitution is promulgated.
As for the structure of the regional government, legislative power is
lodged in the parliament, formally known as the Kurdish National
Assembly, executive power is divided between a regional president and
prime minister, and judicial power is centered on a judicial assembly
composed of judges drawn from the various courts." 7 Separation of
powers language is flirted with throughout Chapter 3, but it is difficult to
go too far down this road in a parliamentary system.'' 8
The threshold for introducing legislation in parliament is low-ten
or more members,"' who may also question the prime minister and his
113.

CONsT. oF KURDISTAN art. 67(4).

114.

CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 67.

115. Kamal Said Qadir, Iraqi Kurdistan's Downward Spiral, 14 MIDDLE E. Q. 19,
(Summer 2007), available at http://www.meforum.org/1703/iraqi-kurdistans-downwardspiral.
116. CONsT. OF KURDISTAN art. 71.
117.
118.

CONsT. OF KURDISTAN ch. 3.
See THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 408 (Vernon

Bogdanor ed., 1987) ("Unlike Presidential government, which is based on the separation
of powers principle, the parliamentary system involves the fusion of the executive and
legislative powers.").
119. CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 89. Although not mentioned in the constitution, the
members of parliament with whom we spoke indicated that every KRG law (whether
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cabinet-over which parliament retains the power to remove through a
vote of no confidence by two-thirds of the members. 120 Parliament also
has the power to remove the president or vice president by majority vote
if the Constitutional Court has accused either of a violation of their oath,
a violation of the constitution, or high treason. 12 1 Another potentially
powerful tool is the parliamentary investigative committee.122
The executive is strong, yet divided between a president and prime
minister-who leads the majority coalition in parliament. 123 It is unclear
whether this divided executive will shade more in practice toward the
French or Russian model. Under the French model, "co-habitation"
between presidents and prime ministers of different parties is common,
but both have clearly defined powers and do not as a matter of course
intrude on one another's area of authority. If Barham Salih of the PUK
becomes Prime Minister in 2009, then a co-habitation with President
Barzani of the KDP is possible. But, as the president is limited to two
four-year terms, Massoud Barzani, the current president and powerful
leader of the KDP, may eventually lead the executive branch toward the
Russian model if a junior KDP official is Prime Minister but then
becomes president. Russian president Vladimir Putin, facing a similar
term limit, became the prime minister under a weak figurehead president
so that he could continue to wield power.124
Although the president exercises an objection power that is not quite
as strong as a veto power, he does have the power to dissolve parliament,
propose legislation, depose ministers, convene and lead the Ministers'
Council, and issue executive decrees that have legal equivalency with
parliamentary laws.125 His powers to declare emergencies, dispatch the
military, grant amnesty, and commute death sentences1 2 6 are not
especially distinct from those granted executives in other constitutions.
The prime minister and his council of ministers run the day to day
affairs of the region, per the normal functioning of such offices.
Interestingly, there is provision in Article 111 for a fair representation of
promulgated by parliament or a decree by the president was unclear) must cross-reference
an article of the constitution.
120. CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 90.
121. CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 93(4).
122. CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 93(13). If the parliamentary investigative committee
is empowered by subsequent law supporting this constitutional provision to conduct
independent hearings, subpoena witnesses, and issue contempt citations along the lines of
House or Senate committees in the U.S. Congress, then a substantial check on executive
power can potentially emerge.
123. CONST. OF KURDISTAN ch. 3, part 2.
124. C.J. Chivers, Protdgd in Russia is Sworn In, N.Y. TIMEs, May 7, 2008, at A6,
availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/07/world/europe/07moscow.html?_r--1.
125. CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 104.
126. Id.
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minorities in the council of ministers. There is some sensitivity to the
question of diversity within the government already. The cabinet of
Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani (the president's nephew and
influential member of the KDP) includes a Christian finance minister, for

instance.12 7
But the most completely articulated section of the constitution
dealing with the prime minister concerns his sway over the oil and gas
sector of the Kurdish economy. Article 113 empowers the prime
minister to draw up the oil and gas policy for the region and, after
parliamentary approval, implement it.128 The provisions call for the
prime minister to jointly administer oil and gas fields with the federal
government that were in production prior to August 15, 2005 at a rate of
five thousand barrels per day.129 Taken in tandem with the region's oil
and gas law, discussed below, and control of the region's budget, the
prime minister is essentially the chief architect of the region's economy.
There are currently forty-two ministers in the prime minister's
cabinet.130 This was widely regarded as excessive by the politicians,
parliamentarians, and the members of the general population with whom
we interacted during our visit to Kurdistan. However, the patronage and
nepotism strands in Kurdish society run deep and long. These impulses
have ensured party loyalty in difficult times and, consequently, are
viewed as valid survival techniques. It will be hard to dislodge them
completely.' 3'
Corruption has long influenced the judiciary in Kurdistan.13 2 This is
not surprising given the security situation the Kurds had to endure.
Nevertheless, a complete lack of judicial independence, party loyalty of
the judges, favoritism, and random judgments led to an atmosphere of
unpredictability.' 33 This atmosphere was exacerbated by a system of
courts divided among parties and other entities that neither worked in
concert nor toward the ends of justice:

127. The finance minister is an Assyrian named Sarkis Aghajan Mamendu. Peter
Kenyon, Christian Security Forces Growing Stronger in Iraq, NPR NEWS, Oct. 6, 2008,
availableat http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=95343489.
128. CONST. OF KuRDISTAN art. 113.
129. Id.
130. See Caught in the Whirlwind: Torture and Denial of Due Process by the
Kurdistan Security Forces, Human Rights Watch Report, at 15 n. 22 (July 2, 2007),
availableat http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kurdistanO707webwcover.pdf.
131. See CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 153 (prohibiting government officials from
engaging in business or real estate affairs, but not prohibiting their family members from
engaging in this activity).
132. See Qadir, supra note 115.
13 3. Id.
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The legal system of the region is both chaotic and compromised.
There are five parallel judicial systems in Iraqi Kurdistan: the regular
courts, state security courts to try political offences, military courts
with jurisdiction over peshmerga forces, separate KDP and PUK
party courts known as Komalayati (social) courts, and special tribal
courts with jurisdiction only over the members of a certain tribe.
With the exception of the regular courts that apply Iraqi laws, all the
other courts are, in fact, illegal. Their judgments are arbitrary and
often contradict the law. 34
Recognizing that the rule of law and judicial independence are
cornerstones to a stable society and growing economy, which the
regional government seeks to boost through foreign investment,' 3 5 the
constitution goes a long way toward rooting out the problems endemic to
the pre-constitutional judiciary.
Responding to criticisms leveled against the courts, the first article
in the judicial section mandates an independent judiciary.13 6 Judges are
prohibited from holding other posts, maintaining party affiliations, or
participating in political activity. 37 Court hearings are presumed
open.' 38 As private or exceptional courts are banned, 139 party courts will
be a thing of the past, although special courts continue to exist for

peshmerga forces.140
Separate courts will also be allowed to control family and social
issues for followers of non-Muslim religions. 14 1 Such courts are not
unknown in the West. Tribal courts exist within Native American
communities of the United States. These are separate from state courts,
but like state courts, their decisions are potentially reviewable by the
federal courts. Jurisdiction in these courts is likewise limited to family
and social issues, although these courts often also retain misdemeanorlevel criminal jurisdiction. 4 2
In the United Kingdom, separate Islamic courts have also been
allowed to deal with family and social issues-although the decisions of
134. Id.
135. Kirk Semple, Pointing to Stability, Kurds in Iraq Lure Investors, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/27/world/
middleeast/27kurds.html.
136. CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 116.
137. CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 120.
138. CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 121.
139. CONST. oF KURDISTAN art. 122.
140. CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 123. Note that the wording of this article is broad
enough that it could conceivably become the basis for a national security court if the
government moved to devise one.
141. CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 124.
142. DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON & ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR.,
FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 414-455 (5th ed. 2005).
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these courts must be approved by a local state court to be given legal
force. 143 Some, worry, however, that women's rights within the British
Muslim community could be impaired by this new system:
Robert Whelan, of the Civitas think-tank, said: 'The problem with
the Government's attitude is the big question over how far
submission to sharia courts is voluntary among Muslim women.
'Women who live in some communities may have no option but to go
to the sharia court. The case is then rubber-stamped by a family
court without any of us knowing how the decision was reached.'" 44
Nevertheless, as of June 2009, it is estimated that at least 85
separate sharia courts were operating in the U.K. to serve the needs of
Britain's Muslim community.145 This is in keeping with a longer
tradition of allowing religious communities in Britain to exercise some
internal dispute resolution functions. "The Church of England has its
own ecclesiastical courts. British Jews have had their own 'beth din'
courts for more than a century."l 4 6 Thus, the provision for separate
courts for religious communities in the Kurdish constitution is by no
means a new concept. How it is ultimately implemented, however, will
be the test of its effectiveness.
As for governance of the judiciary in Iraqi Kurdistan, a judicial
authority is established as a separate and independent entity comprised of
prosecutors and judges from the various courts,14 7 as well as a judicial
assembly comprised of the heads of those divisions.14 8 The judicial
assembly monitors the independence of the judiciary1 4 9 and the judicial
authority controls its own budget 5 0-which, if true, can be a real
testament to judicial independence.

143. Steve Doughty, Islamic Courts Cleared to Deal with Family and Divorce
Disputes as Government Endorses Sharia, DAILY MAIL (London), Oct. 25, 2008,
available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1080509/Islamic-courts-cleareddeal-family-divor ce-disputes-Government-endorses-sharia.html.
144. Id.
145. John Bingham, At Least 85 Sharia 'Courts' operating in Britain, Says Civitas
Report, TELEGRAPH (London), June 29, 2009, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/newstopics/religion/5675166/At-least-85-sharia-courts-operating-in-Britain-saysCivitas-report.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). For procedures on divorce and other
family matters in the U.K., see The Islamic Sharia Council, http://www.islamicsharia.org/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2009).
146. Elaine Sciolino, Britain Grapples with Role for Islamic Justice, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 18, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/world/europe/
19shariah.html.
147. CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 130.
148. CONsT. OF KURDISTAN art. 131.
149. CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 131(2).
150. CONsT. OF KURDISTAN art. 132.
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Yet judicial independence is more a behavior that evolves over time
and, although the wording of the constitution seeks to back this goal, it is
only just a goal. Procedure and practice are the meat and potatoes of
judicial independence, and these have not yet been served-we've only
the menu. Many constitutions declare judicial independence to be the
norm, like that of Zimbabwe, 15' but of course the courts operate very
closely under a political yoke. Missing provisions in the Kurdish
constitution on how long judges serve (lifetime versus term of years) are
put off under Article 130 for subsequent legislation.15 2 Thus, a legal
culture must grow up in Kurdistan to carry this pledge forward
meaningfully.
The Constitutional Court is tasked with interpreting the constitution
and is comprised of seven members who each possess at least twenty
years legal experience.' 53 They are selected by the judicial assembly in
consultation with the regional president.154 The interpretive task of the
Constitutional Court will make it a key player as arguments over regional
control of oil and gas fields move forward.
The provisions on finances and local government are standard. The
amendment procedures can be initiated by the president and prime
minister acting jointly or by half the members of parliament, which in
any case must approve an amendment by a two-thirds vote.' 55 No
amendment can undermine the republican, democratic or parliamentary
system.' 56 The constitution is deemed ratified once a majority of the
regional population has approved it in a referendum by majority vote,
and it becomes effective sixty days thereafter. 5
B.

The Question ofKirkuk

Traditionally regarded as the capital of Kurdistan, the city of Kirkuk
was "Arabized" by Saddam's regime. Strategically located over vast oil
reserves, Saddam considered it unwise to leave the "treacherous" Kurds
(who backed Iran in the Iran-Iraq War) in sole possession of the city. 5 9
Thus, thousands of Kurds were dispossessed of their homes and
relocated elsewhere to make room for Sunni Arab families loyal to the

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

CONST. OF ZIMBABWE art. 79B.
CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 130,.
CONST. OF KURDISTAN arts. 134, 137.
CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 134.
CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 159.

156.

Id.

157.
158.

CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 158.
CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 160.

159.

Michael J. Kelly, The Tricky Nature of Proving Genocide Against Saddam

Hussein Before the IraqiSpecial Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 983, 988-89 (2005).
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regime to move in and repopulate the city. The resulting ethnicity-laced
property disputes, possession of the city and use of the oil under it are
key points of contention between the Kurdish regional government and
Baghdad.160
Yet the struggle to dominate Kirkuk is not a new one. The city has
been contested for centuries:
Nebuchadnezzar, exploiting Jewish captives from Palestine, built the
Citadel and a stone bridge leading to it . .

..

Alexander the Great,

Central Asian tribes of Kara-Qoyunlu, Aq-Qoynulu, the Seljuks, and
numerous other conquering armies have waged wars here to control
the trade routes connecting Persia and Istanbul with Baghdad.
In 1732, the Safavid and the Ottoman Empires fought bitter wars over
control of Kirkuk; Safavid Nadir Shah won. A year later, the city
was in the hands of the Ottoman Empire, to be lost once more in
1743 to the Safavids. Finally, the 1746 peace treaty gave the control
to the Turks. Thus, Kirkuk remained under Ottoman domination for
a little short of three centuries, until the end of World War I (in
1918), when they lost the war and Iraq.161
Kirkuk is now a multi-ethnic city with a mixed population of
roughly 52% Kurds, 35% Arabs, 12% Turkomen (ethnic cousins of
Turks) and about 12,000 Christians. 16 2 The supergiant oilfield that lies
under the city is reason enough for any faction to try to assert control
over it, let alone the historical and political grudges.

160.

Sam Dagher, Can the US. Avert a Kirkuk Border War?,

MONITOR,

CHUSTIAN SCI.
April 25, 2008, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0425/p06s02-

wome.htm.
161.

ASTARIAN, supra note 6, at 1.

162. U.N. Gives Iraq Report on Troubled Kirkuk, USA TODAY, Apr. 22, 2009,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2009-04-22-iraq-report-N.htm

The Kurdish regional government has exhaustively catalogued, document by document,
the displacement of the Kurdish population from Kirkuk and other Kurdish areas in a
2007 report. See generally KRG MINISTRY OF ExTRA REGIONAL AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES INKIRKUK AND THE DISPUTED REGIONS (Dec. 2007), available

at http://www.perleman.org/files/articles/130508111135.pdf.
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rigure z: ine NpeaKer oi tne ILurIsn egionai rarnament, Aunan iviuMt, points to
Kirkuk, identified on an 1878 Ottoman Empire map as the capital of Kurdistan
(photo taken March, 2009, in the Speaker's office).

Yet, the Kurds identify with Kirkuk in a similar fashion to the
Jewish identification with Jerusalem. Although the Kurdish capital and
largest city is Erbil, as Tel Aviv is Israel's functional capital and largest
city, the place of Kirkuk in the hearts of the Kurdish population-no
matter what their political allegiance, is special. 1 63 And, there is little
political appetite in Erbil to give it up, despite Baghdad's reluctance to
recognize Kirkuk as part of the Kurdistan region.
The Kurdish gambit to reclaim Kirkuk included identifying it as part
of the region of Iraqi Kurdistan in Article 2 of the Kurdish
constitution.164 This does not directly contravene the Iraqi constitution,
which calls in Article 140 for a referendum in Kirkuk "to determine the
will of their citizens." 65 But it is, nevertheless, at least hopeful and at
most provocative depending upon one's point of view.

163. An earlier draft of the Kurdish regional constitution identified Kirkuk as the
capital, but later versions abandoned this in favor of Erbil, see CONSTITUTION OF
KURDISTAN art. 11, in order to diffuse the rhetoric and rely instead on the promise of
Article 140 in the Iraqi federal constitution to instead deliver the city over to Kurdish
control.
164. CONST. OF KURDISTAN art. 2.
165. CONST. OF IRAQ art. 140(2).
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The [Kurdish] constitution contains nothing remarkably new and
does not call for full Kurdish independence. It does, however, firmly
spell out the Kurds' aspirations to take full control of areas they
consider to be part of a Kurdish national homeland, including Kirkuk.
The oil rich northern city has become a central point of contention
between Erbil and Baghdad and has come to symbolize [sic] the
competing aims of each authority. The Kurdish constitution insists
that a referendum must be held over Kirkuk's future, with residents
allowed to decide whether the city joins the Kurdish area or stays
outside, under the umbrella of the central government. Such a
referendum is enshrined in Article 140 of Iraq's national constitution
and should already have been held. But, with the Kurds certain they
have a majority of the population, it has been indefinitely delayed by
Baghdad. Instead, the United Nations has been brought in to come
up with possible compromise solutions for Kirkuk and other disputed
zones. 166
In 2007, the International Crisis Group issued a set of
recommendations to resolve the Kirkuk impasse, calling for Baghdad and
Erbil to share oil and power and postpone the referendum on the city's
fate, for Turkey to stay out of it, for the U.N. to build consensus, and for
the U.S. to provide protection and funding for development.16 7 This
initiative was acknowledged but not widely embraced.'6 8 The United
Nations then attempted to broker a deal between the two sides on the fate
of the city.
In April 2009, a special U.N. commission issued a set of
recommendations designed to resolve the disputed status of several
territories in Iraq-including Kirkuk.169 The document was not publicly
released, but laid out four possible options-two of which kept the city
as a single entity and called for the residents to ultimately decide their
fate. One option creates Kirkuk as an autonomous region of Iraq run by
Kurds, Arabs and Turkomen with a budget financed by Kirkuk's oil
revenues. 170 Another option creates Kirkuk as a "special region" jointly
administered by the Kurdish regional government and the central

166. Sands and Latif, supra note 79.
167. International Crisis Group, Iraq and the Kurds: Resolving the Kirkuk Crisis,
MIDDLE EAST REPORT No. 64, Apr. 19, 2007, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/
home/index.cfm?id-4782.

168. Nouri Talabany, Who Owns Kirkuk? The Kurdish Case, 14 MIDDLE EAST Q. 75
(Winter, 2007), available at http://www.meforum.org/1075/who-owns-kirkuk-thekurdish-case.
169. Timothy Williams, U.N. Report Lays Out Options for Oil-Rich Iraqi Region,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/23/world/

middleeast/23iraq.html.
170. Id.
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government in Baghdad with a referendum on the city's final status
delayed for five years.17 1
However, fresh from an overwhelming re-election as president of
the Kurdish regional government in July 2009, Massoud Barzani rejected
the U.N. proposal on Kirkuk, "'Regrettably, the recommendations of the
United Nations are unrealistic."'l 72 President Barzani, instead, insists on
effectuating the Iraqi federal constitution's provisions on Kirkuk which,
he rightly believes, will deliver the city to his region. "'We will not
accept that the United Nations or anyone else present us with alternatives
to Article 140.'",173
Our team discussed some options directed at finessing the Kirkuk
issue with the constitutional drafting committee. Among those the
committee found most interesting was the notion of guaranteeing Arab
seats in the regional parliament for Arabs living in Kirkuk, along the
lines of dedicated Christian, Armenian and Turkomen seats. Another
idea involved divorcing the question of Kirkuk from the question of the
oilfields underlying it. In other words, the Kurds could "buy Kirkuk" by
allowing Baghdad to control Kirkuk's oil for ten or twelve years in
exchange for allowing the city of Kirkuk to pass into the region.
C.

Oil Resources

A second major area of contention between the dueling federal and
regional constitutions concerns oil. A viable region within a federal
structure should have an economic base, and that base in Iraqi Kurdistan
is a mix of agriculture and oil. Agriculture, not surprisingly, is the least
contentious of these. Thus, a large amount of time and effort was spent
by the constitutional drafting committee on the question of regional
control over oil exploration and production.
Figure-3 depicts oil infrastructure in the Kurdish areas of northern
Iraq. The Tawke and Taq Taq fields have already gone into production
under controversial production sharing agreements negotiated by the
Kurdish regional government with foreign firms that were concluded
with neither input nor permission from the federal government.1 74
171. Id.
172. Dagher, supra note 5.
173. Id.
174. Kurdistan Goes Glug Glug; Iraq's Kurdish Oil, THE EcoNoMIST, May 30, 2009,
at 48:
The Tawke field will start by pumping 60,000 barrels a day (b/d). A new
pipeline will carry the crude from the wells east of Zakho to join the main
northern pipeline on the Iraqi side of the Turkish border. Meanwhile 40,000
b/d will be trucked from the Taq-Taq site to Khurmala. The crude from both
fields will flow through Turkey to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. Mr
Hawrami (the Kurdish minister of natural resources) says the new fields should
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The operations at Taq-Taq and Tawke are run under PSAs whereby
private companies get 10-20% of the profit. The rest goes to the
federal government in Baghdad before being distributed across the
rest of Iraq. But Iraq's oil ministry and its trade unions dislike PSAs.
A long row between the Kurds and the authorities in Baghdad over
rules for the north has yet to be resolved. Baghdad wants to approve
all oil deals. The Kurds say the federal constitution lets them runand profit from-their own oil industry, though they accept that
revenue should somehow be shared. The Kurds' parliament passed a
hydrocarbons law in 2007. But a new national oil law has been
stalled in the federal parliament in Baghdad for at least three years.
The Kurds say they have shown up the decrepitude of Iraq's oil
establishment. Despite billions of dollars of investment since 2003,
production is still just over 2m b/d, about what it was when Saddam
Hussein was toppled.
The federal oil minister, Hussein alShahristani, loathes the Kurds' success and has tried to stop them
running their own oil industry, declaring all deals (now at least 20)
signed by them to be illegal. He has also threatened to blacklist any
oil company that does business up north from applying for licences
[sic] down south.175

tigure j: uii inirastructurein ana Arouno NIKUK

(pource:

.1A, LUU3)

produce 450,000 b/d by 2011 and Im b/d by the end of 2012. That would
represent 42% of Iraq's production, if output from the rest of the country stays
the same.
175. Id.
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There is no set pattern for Kurdistan to follow, in a federalism
context, for a consistent balance of authority between regions and the
central government over oil exploration and production.
Some
federations reserve this power to the central government exclusively,
while others allow a degree of control to the regions over some or most
aspects of the oil sector.
For example, in the United States, 17 6 Canada, 17 Australia, 7 1 power
is shared between state/provincial governments and the federal
government in the oil sector. In the U.S., oil and gas exploration and
production are governed by either public or private leases (oil and gas
can be private property in the U.S.) and the public lessee can be either
the state or federal government, depending upon whether the area of
development in question is owned by the state or federal government.17 9
The situation is somewhat analogous in Canada, but only in the
sense of shared power. The provinces exercise much more direct control
over their natural resources-which results in a lack of uniformity across
the country. "Canada's federal government and provincial governments
share jurisdiction over energy policy and, accordingly, there is no single
energy policy in place." 18 0 The divergence in power allocation in Canada
is mainly attached to onshore versus offshore resources.' 8 ' Onshore, "the
provinces have clear constitutional authority with respect to oil and gas
activities . . . within their province."' 82 But offshore, "the right to

176. Charles Caldwell, Cathy Lewis, Larry Nettles & William Vigor, United States,
in OL REGULATION IN 28 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 145 (Craig Spum ed., 2009)
("Regulation is differentiated between the federal and state levels and by segment.").
177. Id. at 146:
The right to explore and develop oil on the lands of others (whether public or
private) is obtained through oil and gas leases. The terms of these oil and gas
leases control the activities of the lessees together with some federal and state
regulations governing protection of the environment and other matters. Leases
that are negotiated between private individuals and private owners may follow
widely used forms or may contain terms and conditions specific to the given
lease. Separate state agencies control the exploration and production of oil
from state-owned public lands.

For federal lands

,. .

. [t]he Department of

Interior regulates....
178. Nathan Evans, Offshore Petroleum in Australia-CooperativeGovernance in a
Sea of Federalism, 26 DALHOUSIE L.J. 175, 176 (2003) ("In Australia, offshore
hydrocarbon development legislation established a shared policy and administration
regime, under which the Commonwealth and states are essentially equal partners in
decision-making.").
179. Craig Spurn and Selina Lee-Andersen, Canada, in OIL REGULATION IN 28
JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 27 (Craig Spurn, ed. 2009).
180. Id
181. Keith R. Evans, Canadian East Coast Offshore Oil and Gas Industry:
Sustainable Development Through Cooperative Federalism, 26 DALHOUSIE L.J. 149
(2003).
182. Id at 151.
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explore and exploit mineral resources in the seabed . .. has been held by
the Supreme Court of Canada to stem from the sovereign rights of the
coastal state"-which is Canada.183
It was our impression that increased control over the energy sector
within the region is clearly the path that the Kurdish Regional
Government wishes to follow if it can. Thus, the Canadian constitutional
format could prove instructive for Kurdistan as it seeks to balance its
constitutional relationship with the federal government on the question of
controlling the oil sector. As the Kurdish region is a landlocked unit,
Canadian offshore federal supremacy would not be analogous-only the
onshore provincial control.
In Canada,
The division of powers between federal and provincial governments
is set out in the Constitution Act of 1867. Generally, the federal
government has jurisdiction over matters of national and international
importance, whereas the provinces have jurisdiction over matters of a
local or private nature....
The federal government has authority to make laws for 'peace, order
and good government' in relation to all matters not exclusively
assigned to the provinces and including the regulation of trade and
commerce. The provinces have authority over property and civil
rights and in respect of exploration for, and conservation and
management of, non-renewable natural resources in the province.
Balancing the federal government's authority over trade and
commerce with the provinces' specific powers presents a challenge in
determining which level of government is responsible for regulating a
particular matter. Jurisdiction will typically be determined based
upon the location, nature and scope of the matter and certain other
factors. Canadian courts have traditionally interpreted the federal
power over trade and commerce to be limited to inter-provincial and
international trade and commerce and to general trade and commerce,
which has been narrowly interpreted and historically applied most
significantly to intra-provincial aspects of business competition.
Accordingly, the two levels o government exercise constitutional
powers in respect of different aspects of energy development,
transportation, marketing and use. Generally the provinces regulate
local matters regarding oil and gas exploration and production and
energy transportation and marketing within its provincial boundaries.
With respect to energy transportation and marketing, the movement
of goods inter-provincially is regulated by the federal government.
183. Id. (citing Reference re: Seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf offshore
Newfoundland, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 86 (Can.).
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Likewise, pipelines which cross provincial
boundaries are under federal jurisdiction. 184
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or international

Moreover, each province within the Canadian federation can adopt its
own unique approach to the regulation and production of oil over which
it enjoys jurisdiction.185 Alberta is an example of one model.
[I]n Alberta, the ERCB [Energy Resources and Conservation Board]
requires that participants seeking to license for and engage in oil
exploration, development and production activities obtain a business
associate code.

A corporation applying for a . .. code must be

resident in Alberta, which means that it must have an office and staff
located in Alberta. 186
But in some federations, the central government enjoys a
constitutionally mandated monopoly in the oil sector, most often
exercising this control via a corporate entity, as is the case in Brazil,'87
Mexico,18 8 and Nigeria. 189 This arrangement can be made at the state's
creation or constitution's adoption, or it can come about over time.
Malaysia is a good example of the latter. A federation of thirteen states
and three federal territories created in 1963 by a union of the Malay
states and former British Crown colonies of Sabah, Sarawak, and
Singapore (Singapore left the union in 1965), Malaysia initially

184.

Spurn and Lee-Anderson, supra note 162.

185. Id. at 29 ("The regulatory authority in each jurisdiction ... requires that a party
seeking to undertake exploration and production activities by licensed and each proposed
activity be licensed. Each province has its own set of procedures, criteria and fees for
obtaining these licenses.").
186. Id.
187. Luiz Antonio Maia Espinola de Lemos, Brazil, in Ow REGULATION IN 28
JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 23 (Craig Spurn, ed. 2009) ("The Brazilian Federal
Constitution establishes that all activities related to the oil industry are a federal
government monopoly. Notwithstanding, such activities may be delegated to stateowned or private companies, with due regard for the conditions set forth by the
Petroleum Law.").
188. Mayuca Salazar Canales & Gabriel Ruiz Rocha, Mexico, in OIL REGULATION IN
28 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 88-89 (Craig Spurn, ed. 2009) ("The key participant in the
oil industry is . .. Pemex, Mexico's state-owned oil company. In accordance with
Mexican law, Mexico maintains direct ownership over oil ... and only Pemex is charged
by law to develop Mexico's oil reserves on behalf of the nation... . [A]rticle 27 of the
Mexican Constitution provides that all natural resources, including hydrocarbons, are the
property of the nation.").
189. Soji Awogbade, Sina Sipasi & Gloria Iroegbunam, Nigeria, in OIL REGULATION
IN 28 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 94 (Craig Spurn, ed. 2009) ("The entire property and
control of oil in place within any land in Nigeria, under its territorial waters, continental
shelf and exclusive economic zone is vested in the federal government by virtue of the
Constitution of Nigeria (1999) and the Petroleum Act.").
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established in its first constitution that onshore oil would be controlled
by the states, not the central government.190
The Federal Constitution defines the distribution of legislative
powers and responsibilities between the federal and state
governments. It stipulates that all mineral resources, including oil,
within or upon any land in a state are owned by the state and the state
government is allowed to collect revenue from such mineral
resources. Exploration and production of oil were made pursuant to
oil prospecting licenses and oil mining leases pursuant to the Mining
Enactments of the States in Peninsular Malaysia; the Mining
Ordinance of Sabah; and the Oil Mining Ordinance of Sarawak.
Pursuant to these oil prospecting licenses and oil mining leases, oil
companies were granted the exclusive right over all crude oil won
and saved in mining areas in return for payment of rent and royalty to
the state government.191
And in 1966, this regime was further bolstered with the Petroleum
Mining Act, which provided that "companies wanting to explore or
extract oil onshore in any state must apply to the state government for an
exploration license or enter into a petroleum agreement with the state

government."1 9 2
But after the 1973 world oil crisis, Malaysia's central government
acted to consolidate its control over the oil sector and the states were
stripped of their power. The government incorporated a new national oil
company, PETRONAS. Under the Petroleum Development Act of 1974,
"the entire ownership in and exclusive rights, powers, liberties, privileges
of exploring, winning and obtaining petroleum onshore and offshore
Malaysia were vested in PETRONAS." 93 Thus, at least in the onshore
context, the Malaysian experience illustrates how a federation can move
from one extreme to the other over time in power allocation between
states and the central government.
Although not a federation, Denmark has spun off the most authority
over oil exploration and production to the other constituent units of the
Danish Common Community: the Faroe Islands and Greenland. The
Faroe Islands were granted self-rule from Copenhagen in 1948 and a
subsequent 1992 agreement granted the Faroe Islands "independent of
Denmark, . . . the legislative authority and the administration of the area

190.

Faizah Jamaludin, Malaysia, in OIL
82 (Craig Spurn, ed. 2009).
19 1. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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of exploration and production of hydrocarbons."' 94 Greenland was
granted home rule in 1979 and, subsequently, under the 2009 Self-Rule
Act, it was recognized that "Greenland owns and has the right of disposal
of all mineral resources, including oil and gas, in Greenland."l 9 5
Presently, the Kurds appear to be following the more typical
Mexican model in their new oil and gas law, promulgated before the
constitution, with a ministry and a nationalized company to oversee
operations.196 This perhaps rests on the premise that they operate
economically as a defacto state along the lines of Taiwan already. But
the most fruitful model to follow for the Kurdish Regional Government
might be the Canadian model, where provinces control their own natural
resources, and each province within the federation may adopt their own
exploration and development rules independent of the other provinces.
The 2005 Iraqi federal constitution may allow the Kurds to do just that.
D.

A Reverse Supremacy Opportunityon the Question of Oil

Figure 3 depicts the oil resources in and around the Kurdistan
region. The oil fields close to Kirkuk and to the east include Demir
Dagh, Taqtaq, Chamchamal, Kor Mor, and perhaps Chia Surkh. Who
controls these oil fields is a constitutional question that depends upon the
interplay between the Kurdish regional constitution and the Iraqi federal
constitution.
As noted earlier, the Iraqi constitution is supreme in designated
areas, over which the federal government enjoys exclusive authority. Oil
is not one of them. The Kurdish delegation was incredibly successful in
pushing this item into an area of shared competency during negotiations
on the Iraqi constitution.
[T]he drafting history shows the relative success of the Kurds during
the negotiation process.... By the end of the process ... many of
the exclusive authorities in the earlier drafts had been shifted to the
section on joint competencies, and the federal government's authority
to directly manage oil and gas had been cut back to apply expressly
only to resources from "present fields." The result, therefore, favored

194.

Per Hemmer, Johan Weihe & Per Vestergaard Pedersen, Faroe Islands, in OIL

REGULATION IN28 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 41 (Craig Spurn, ed. 2009).

195. Per Hemmer, Johan Weihe, Per Vestergaard Pedersen & Rania Kassis,
Greenland, in OL REGULATION IN28 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 51 (Craig Spurn, ed.
2009).
196. Oil & Gas Law of the Kurdistan Region-Iraq art. 6-61, 2007, available at
http://www.perleman.org/files/articles/070708090735.pdf [hereinafter Oil and Gas Law
of the Kurdistan Region].
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the overall Kurdish interest in limiting the role of the federal
government in Iraq and ensuring broad powers for the KRG. 197
Article 112 is the operative portion of the Iraqi federal constitution
that establishes some room for maneuver by the Kurdish regional
government on the question of controlling oil resources within Kurdistan.
It should be read in the context of Article 111, which places ownership of
oil wealth in people of Iraq and the regions.198
Article 112:
First: The federal government, with the producing governorates and
regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas
extracted from present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues
in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all
parts of the country, specifying an allotment for a specified period for
the damaged regions which were unjustly deprived of them by the
former regime, and the regions that were damaged afterwards in a
way that ensures balanced development in different areas of the
country, and this shall be regulated by a law.
Second: The federal government, with the producing regional and
governorate governments, shall together formulate the necessary
strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that
achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people using the most
advanced techniques of the market principles and encouraging
investment.199
The definition of the term "present" in section one of Article 112 is
the fulcrum of the argument the Kurds will proffer to control the oil
within Kurdistan. Because the federal government may expressly assert
management over only the present oil fields, "present" not being defined
in the document, and no mention is made of "future" oil fields, the
savings clause of Article 115, reserving all other powers to the regions,
would appear to open the door for Kurdish control of "non-present"
fields in Kurdistan. 2 00 This argument is bolstered on a plain reading of
Article 121, which empowers regions to essentially override federal
legislation that touches on areas outside the exclusive competency of the
federal government.

197. Deeks and Burton, supra note 46, at 64 (citations omitted).
198. CoNsT. OF IRAQ art. 111 ("Oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all
the regions and governorates.").
199. CONsT. OF IuAQ art. 112 (emphasis added).
200. This language did not exist in the interim constitution; the Kurds and Shia had it
inserted. Under the TAL (Art. 25e), the central government controlled the state's oil
wealth. See ARATO, supra note 47, at 235-36.
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"Present" could simply mean known or currently producing. Of
Iraq's eighty known oil and gas fields, only twenty have been
developed. 20 1 Two members of the U.S. delegation that negotiated the
Iraqi constitution acknowledge that this ambiguity in Article 112 could
feasibly cut either direction.20 2 However, they ultimately conclude that,
based upon the legislative history of the negotiations as the Iraqi
constitution was being drafted, an interpretation favoring greater regional
control over truncated federal control of oil resources (based on the use
of Article 115 and buttressed by Article 121) would be disingenuous:
On one hand, Articles 115 and 121(second) could be read to permit
regional or governorate laws to trump federal laws concerning oil and
gas regulation in certain circumstances, because the constitution
technically provides for concurrent jurisdiction over these natural
resources. On the other hand, one might argue that the drafters,
choosing to address oil and gas separately in Articles 111 and 112
rather than within Article 114 on concurrent authorities, did not
intend regional or governorate law automatically to trump federal
laws on oil and gas.
The tenor of the oil and gas negotiations strongly argues for the
second reading. The drafters battled over the oil and gas language for
weeks, ultimately holding up negotiation of all other unresolved areas
until treatment of natural resources was resolved. In contrast, an
early version of Article 115 arrived in the document for the first time
on August 21 with little or no debate preceding its inclusion in the
document.
It seems quite unlikely that the drafters, while
undertaking painstaking efforts to agree that the federal government
would manage oil and gas and distribute income "with" the
producing regional and governorate governments, would have
intended to upend such carefully negotiated language through the
insertion of a last minute provision giving regional and governorate
governments primacy over federal regulation in areas of concurrent
authority. In addition, the drafting history shows that negotiators
considered addressing oil and gas within provisions on exclusive and
concurrent authorities in earlier drafts, but, with the final
compromise, decided to address oil and gas outside of the exclusiveconcurrent dichotomy.
201. Danny Fortson, Kurdistan Defies Iraqi Authorities on Oil Contracts, INDEP.
(London), Feb. 9, 2008, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/
kurdistan-defies-iraqi-authorities-on-oil-contracts-780291.html.
202. Deeks and Burton, supra note 46, at 55 n.306 ("Terms like 'current fields,'
'present fields,' and 'existing fields' are inherently ambiguous. The Kurds may have
intended the proposed term to mean fields where oil and gas are currently being
extracted, but it is at least plausible to define terms like "current" and "present" much
more expansively to encompass fields identified by seismic surveys, whether or not
exploration has begun.").
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Similarly, although Article 121 (second) . . . was included in the draft
Constitution somewhat earlier than Article 115, the singular focus on
resolving the distribution of authority over oil and gas, in conjunction
with the separate textual treatment of these provisions, suggests that
the more reasonable reading is that the drafters did not intend Article
121(second) to override the careful compromise on oil and gas.
[Moreover,] Article 115 ... could be read to mean that the federal
government maintains no authorities outside its area of exclusive
competence. There are at least two textual arguments for rejecting
this interpretation. First, Article 121(second) presumes that the
federal government has the power to enact legislation outside the area
of exclusive federal authority, by providing for regional law
supremacy "in case of a contradiction between regional and national
legislation in respect to a matter outside the exclusive powers of the
federal government." Second, many sections of the constitution that
address areas outside the scope of Article 110 on exclusive
authorities contemplate that the federal legislature will enact laws to
give substantive provisions greater definition and shape.
Here, as above, the negotiating history may help resolve any
lingering textual ambiguity. The late date on which the drafters
introduced Article 115 is not by itself a reason to discount the
meaning of the plain language. However, the timing and ambiguity
of the provision, when juxtaposed against other provisions that
clearly support the federal government's prescriptive legislative
power outside its area of exclusive federal authority, support
disregarding conflicting or unworkable readings of the language.
Instead, Article 115 should be interpreted to achieve consistency with
the rest of this Section and other provisions discussing the respective
primacy of federal and regional law. 203
Conversely, a legal opinion offered by a Cambridge international
law professor concludes that the KRG's authority trumps that of the
federal government. 2 04 Our team was presented a copy of this opinion at
the regional parliament by Chairman Abdulla in a private meeting after
the constitutional drafting committee had departed. It appears to have
been commissioned in 2007 through the London offices of Clifford
Chance LLP by the Prime Minister of the Kurdish Regional Government,
Nechirvan Barzani, specifically to rebut the above assessment.
On the question of interpreting the term "present" in Article 112,
Dr. Crawford argues that this means "[oil] fields already in production.

203. Id. at 66-67 (citations omitted).
204. James Crawford, The Authority of the Kurdistan Regional Government over Oil
and Gas Under the Constitution of Iraq at 6 (Jan. 29, 2008) [on file with author],
republished in the OIL, GAS &ENERGY LAW INTELLIGENCE JOURNAL 3 (2008).
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This interpretation is indicated by the word 'extracted' and by the
reference to 'producing' governates. The clear inference is that Article
112, first, covers oil and gas extracted from fields presently in
production." 2 0 5 Thus, all non-producing fields in Kurdistan would be
"managed by the relevant regional government alone."206
Moreover, the relevant date on which such fields would be deemed
present or not present is, according to Dr. Crawford, the date on which
the Iraqi constitution entered into force (2006). And, as of that date,
there were no producing fields in the Kurdistan region.20 7 Consequently,
a plain reading of the text, divorced from the background of the
negotiations, establishes that:
On the footing that there is a dispute between the federal and regional
authorities [over oil] (of which there can be no doubt), Article 115
provides that priority is to be given to the law of the region-subject
only to the Constitution itself. As to non-producing and future fields,
there is under Article 112, Second, no federal right to manage,
although regional management has to respect strategic policies,
which have still to be formulated by the federal government "with"
the KRG.208
Dr. Crawford also pronounced the twenty concession agreements
already negotiated between the KRG and foreign oil prospectors as
legally valid. 20 9 The KRG, in turn, relied heavily on this legal opinion in
moving forward on those agreements and seeking to conclude others
without the permission of the federal government. 210 To date, major oil
205. Id
206. Id "According to the sworn translator the English phrase 'extracted from' is an
accurate rendering of the Arabic text, which means 'that the management is to be
undertaken only in respect of the oil and gas that has been-now or in the futureextracted from 'present fields."' Id. at n.7.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 12.
209. Id. at 13 ("As to contracts entered into by the Kurdistan Region authorities for
oil and gas development . . ., I see no reason to question their validity or legal effect.
[T]he authority of the KRG to authorize the conclusion and implementation of such
contacts is, in my opinion, unqualified.").
210. Fortson, supra note 183:
The KRG [published] an independent formal legal opinion from James
Crawford, a widely respected expert in international law at Cambridge
University, that the PSAs [oil concession agreements] were legally valid. The
KRG has thus far signed nearly 20 PSAs with different companies. It is in
discussions "with several other parties" and was keen to reassure those thinking
about going into the country that they will not later be invalidated by the
federal government. Alex Munton of Wood McKenzie said: "The legal opinion
is so important because it allows [the KRG] to respond quite strongly to the
argument that what Korea National and OMZ have done is in any way illegal."
Under the terms of PSAs, foreign oil companies agree to put up all of the initial
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companies such as Shell and British Petroleum have been reluctant to
contract with the Kurdish authorities so as not to upset the federal
government. 21 1
Nevertheless, with dueling opinions over controlling oil wealth, this
matter may yet end up before the federal Constitutional Court in
Baghdad. The Kurdish gambit is nothing less than a constitutional ju
jitsu move based upon a reverse supremacy clause argument. The Kurds
have moved ahead with promulgating their own oil law, 2 12 and they fix
the date of definition for current oil fields as those that were "in
Commercial Production prior to 15 August 2005",213 and future oil fields
214
as those not in production as of that date.
The Kurdish regional government will likely take a litigation path to
cement its claims by first seeking an opinion from the Kurdish regional
Constitutional Court-which will be formed once the regional
constitution enters into force. The regional court of cassation will
function as the constitutional court in the interim as the Constitutional
Court is being established. It would be wise for the president to await
the Constitutional Court's creation before bringing such a case.
In any event, the Kurdish Constitutional Court is only empowered
to interpret the Kurdish constitution, not the Iraqi constitution.
Consequently, with this judicial decision in hand, the Kurds would next
take their case to the federal Constitutional Court in Baghdad-banking
on the impartiality of the court to directly interpret the terms of the Iraqi
constitution with their plain meaning as courts in civil code systems
typically do. If the federal Court decided to go into the negotiating
history, then any outcome would be possible.
With a favorable outcome before the Court in Baghdad, the federal
prime minister would then be obligated to implement its decision or be
accused of breaching the principles of the federal constitution-thereby
triggering Article 8's opt-out provision in the Kurdish constitution.
Kurdish secession is always "a threat but not a fatal one, unless they
could take Kirkuk and the oilfields with them .... "215 This too could be

threatened-by force, to which an unstable Iraqi military may not be able
to respond.
The Kurds well know that Turkey, Syria and Iran are anxious never
to see an independent Kurdish state emerge on their borders, lest the
cost of finding and exploiting wells, and then to share in the revenue they
produce for periods of between 20 and 30 years.
211. Id.
212. Oil and Gas Law of the Kurdistan Region, supra note 178.
213. Id. at Art. 16.
214. Id. at Art. 17.
215. ARATO, supra note 47, at 144.
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Kurdish populations in their own respective border areas agitate to break
away and join such a state. Thus, as cagey negotiators, the Iraqi Kurds
may be relying on political pressure from Tehran, Ankara and Damascus
to force Baghdad to concede quite a bit on the oilfields in the interests of
keeping Iraq together and the Kurds within it. Along with U.S. financial
pressure to cut a deal, the central government in Baghdad may have no
choice but to sit down with the Kurds and bargain.
Although the terms of the federal constitution provide for a joint
development agreement, none has yet been reached. And without the
flesh and muscle of such a politically negotiated settlement, all the
parties are left with are the bare legal bones of the constitutional text.
Consequently, while any legal outcome is possible (and is most
interesting to game), a political solution will almost certainly carry the
day on the oil issue.
IV. COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO ETHNIC AUTONOMY IN
FEDERATIONS

The experiences of the Basques and Catalans within Spain, the
Quebecois and Inuit within Canada, and the ethnic republics within
Russia offer some useful examples and cautionary tales for the Kurds of
Iraq to consider as they move forward. While the abbreviated highlights
that follow merely touch the surface of all possible analogies and
structural parities, they hopefully allow the casual reader to place the
evolving situation in Iraqi Kurdistan into a loosely comparative context.
The attraction of the federal model over the unitary model for states
that contain large ethnic minorities is obvious:
In contrast to a unitary state, which is characterized by a high degree
of centralization, the federal state is a system of constitutional power
sharing between a central government and several local governments,
which possess exclusive legislative competencies in certain areas. A
federal state is formed when two or more states (1) conclude a treaty
conferring power over them and their citizens to an organ of the
community composed of the contracting states, and (2) subsequently
accept a federal constitution outlining the competencies of the
federation and member states. Thus the federal state is said to exist
side-by-side with its member states.
Federal states can be found in nearly every region of the world and
contain approximately 40 percent of the world's population.
Federalism has proven to be a particularly popular and effective form
of governance for states administering large land masses with diverse
regions and communities.
By advocating regional autonomy,

federalism produces two important effects.

First, it deflates

secessionist pressures and safeguards national unity.

In a world
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characterized by increasing fragmentation ... measures that can
successfully overcome divisiveness and promote stability cannot be
casually dismissed. Second, it upholds the self-determination of
peoples to organize their own affairs without external interference,
and protects political communities which "often preserve linguistic,
cultural and religious features that would be disrupted or submerged
by central control." 2 16
I only focus on the most obvious federal examples here, and
purposely exclude the experiences of significant ethnic minority
populations in France or the United Kingdom, which do not have federal
structures, or the native populations of Australia, New Zealand or the
United States, which are not granted a constitutional status similar to that
of the Kurds. I would observe in passing, however, that it appears to be
the case that ethnically distinct groups within larger societies tend to fare
better within those societies if they have constitutional tools at their
disposal to leverage some degree of autonomy than those groups who do
not have similar constitutional tools.
A.

Basques and Catalans within Spain

The Basque and Catalan communities that exist within Spain are
culturally and linguistically distinct from the larger Castilian population.
Like the Kurds in Iraq, they have carved out separate provinces or
regions for themselves and enjoy a greater degree of self-government
than other units in Spain. Spain has seventeen autonomous communities
and two autonomous cities.217 The Spanish constitution, which came into
effect in 1978, provided sufficient regional autonomy to muster the
majority support of the Basques for ratification, although the abstention
rate was very high (over 40% of the electorate).218
Since then, the Basque Country, like the other autonomous
communities, has operated under the legal framework of a "Statute of
Autonomy." In the Basques' case, this statute is popularly known as the
Statute of Guernica, and it was enacted in 1979. The Statute lays out the
governing institutions of the Basque Country. It provides for a regional
legislature, executive bodies (including a treasury), and even a judicial
216.

Babak Nikravesh, Quebec and Tatarstan in InternationalLaw, 23

FLETCHER

F.

WORLD AFF. 227, 229-30 (1999).

217. These include Andalucia, Arag6n, Asturias, Baleares, Ceuta, Canarias,
Cantabria, Castilla-La Mancha, Castilla y Le6n, Catalufia, Comunidad Valencia,
Extremadura, Galicia, La Rioja, Madrid, Melilla, Murcia, Navarra, and Pais Vasco. See
Silvia Acierno & Julio Baquero Cruz, The Orderof the Spanish ConstitutionalCourt on
the proposal to convert the Basque Country into afreely associatedcommunity: Keeping
hands offconstitutionalpolitics, 3 INT'L J. OF CONST'L L. 687 (2005).
218. Id.
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branch headed by a Supreme Court of Justice. Eligibility for judicial
posts is grounded in an expectation that candidates be able to speak
Basque and possess an understanding of traditional Basque law. An
important cultural aspect of the Statute is the recognition of both Basque
and Spanish as official languages.
Yet the situation of the judiciary in the three Spanish provinces that
make up the Basque Country is an example of the problem noted in the
introduction to this article of a constitution's language not reflecting
what actually happens. Most of the judges appointed to courts in the
Basque Country are not, in fact, ethnically Basque. They are Castilian.
Consequently, the courts are viewed by Basques as bastions of federal
control in their autonomous area.2 19 Sometimes, this provocation results
in violence, as with the 2001 assassination of a judge by nationalists.22 0
But the problem is somewhat more pedestrian than one might
assume. There are simply not enough trained Basque lawyers entering
the judicial ranks. 2 2 1 A similar problem is faced in the United States by
the courts of American Indian tribes. Judges in those courts are not
typically ethnically Native American. They are mostly white-as are the
public defenders and prosecutors, due to a very low enrollment of Native
Americans in law schools.222 There simply are not enough people of that
ethnicity trained as lawyers who want to return to the reservations to fill
the ranks of tribal judiciaries. Thus, the Caucasian judge who dons the
robe to hold court on an Indian reservation, thereby embodying tribal
sovereignty, is placed in an incongruent position.
Notwithstanding the powers solely within the jurisdiction of the
Basque government (expressly provided in Article 10 and ranging from
delimitation of municipal territories to tourism and sport), 223 the Statute
provides that it is still incumbent on the autonomous community to
execute the legislation of the "State," i.e. the Spanish national
government. Furthermore, according to the Basque government, many
of the powers expressly granted to the Basques under the Statute of
219. Interview with Senator Aitor Esteban Bravo, MP Spanish Parliament, in Omaha,
Neb. (Nov. 3, 2009).
220. Emma Daly, Spanish Judge Shot to Death; Basque Rebels are Suspected, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001, at 8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/08/world/
spanish-judge-shot-to-death-basque-rebels-are-suspected.html.
221. Esteban interview, supra note 191.
222. See generally, Barbara Ann Atwood, Tribal Jurisprudence and Cultural
Meanings of the Family, 79 NEB. L. REv. 577 (2000); Wenona T. Singel, Labor and
Employment Laws in Indian Country: The Institutional Economics of Tribal Labor
Relations, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REv. 487, 501 (2008) ("Throughout Indian country, there
are a large number of tribes that allow non-Indians to hold public office. For example, it
is very common for non-Indians to serve as judges on tribal courts.").
223. Statute of Autonomy, Articles 10.1 and 10.36, available at http://www.basques.
euskadi.net/t32-448/en/contenidos/informacion/estatutoguernicalen455/estatu-i.html.
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Guernica have yet to actually be transferred to the region. This includes
the National Employment Institute, the management of the Basque
Country's ports and airports, and the organization and operation of
prisons.224 Finally, the use of the term "State" indicates a continued
respect for and adherence to Spain's federal structure.
In October 2003, the Basque government adopted a proposal,
commonly known as the Ibarretxe Plan, for a new Statute for the Basque
Country. The new statute would amend the 1979 version considerably,
giving the Basque autonomous community increased powers, some in
areas reserved explicitly for the Spanish government, such as
international relations.
The Ibarretxe Plan was inspired by the
commonwealth status of Puerto Rico within the United States.22 5
Article 161(2) of the Spanish Constitution provides that "the
government may challenge the provisions and resolutions adopted by the
organs of the Autonomous Communities before the Constitutional
Court," and indeed it did challenge the amendment as unconstitutional on
the basis that it was, in fact, "an original constitutional act disguised as a
proposal for the amendment of the Statute of Autonomy."226
Nonetheless, the Court held that the government's challenge was
premature and improperly based on Article 161(2).227
The Court supported its holding on the grounds that there can only
be a constitutional breach after political debate has subsided, a vote has
occurred, and the enactment of legislation is complete. Because the
legislative process regarding the statutory amendment was still
incomplete at that time, the government's challenge was deemed
inadmissible. In order to come into force, the amendment needed to be
approved by the Spanish parliament and by a referendum in the Basque
country. Not surprisingly, the plan for amendment was rejected by the
Spanish parliament in February of 2005 by a vote of 313 to 29.228
On the national level, the Spanish Constitution deals with the power
division between the state and the autonomous communities in a fairly
complex series of sections (i.e., articles). On a macroscopic level,
section 153 seems to provide the vehicles for maintaining control over
the autonomous regions. It provides that:
Control over the bodies of the Self-governing Communities shall be
exercised by:
224. Id.
225. Katya Adler, Basques Seek 'Puerto Rico' Deal, BBC NEWS, Sept. 25, 2003,
availableat http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hileurope/3140714.stm.
226. Acierno & Cruz, supra note 199, at 689.
227. Id. at 687 (citing Case No. 6761-2003, STC, April 20, 2004, available at
http://www.tribunal constitutional.es/ATC2004.htm.).
228. Acierno & Cruz, supra note 199.
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a) The Constitutional Court, in matters pertaining to the
constitutionality of their regulatory provisions having the force
of law.
b) The Government, after the handing down by the Council of
State of its opinion, regarding the exercise of delegated
functions referred to in section 150, subsection 2.
c) Jurisdictional bodies of administrative litigation with regard
to autonomic administration and its regulations.
d) The Auditing Court, with regard to financial and budgetary
matters.229
As an enforcement mechanism, section 155(1) provides that failure
by an autonomous region to comply with the obligations imposed on it
by the Spanish government entitles the government to "take all measures
necessary to compel the Community to meet said obligations, or to
protect the [general interest of Spain]."230
In matters of regional autonomy, Catalonia shares much in common
with the Basque Country, as it is also governed by a Statute of Autonomy
that was adopted in 2006 to update the older one adopted in 1979. The
new law is known as the Organic Law. 231 The primary difference with
the Basques is that, to date, there appears to have been no proposals in
the Catalan community quite like that of the Ibarretxe Plan in the Basque
country. The Organic Law allows for shared jurisdiction with the federal
government in many areas, but places emphasis on primary jurisdiction
in the Catalan government for culture, education, environment, health,
justice, commerce, public safety, transportation, and communication. In
fact, the Catalans have their own police force-although this is along the
lines of a constabulary as opposed to a full-blown military like the Kurds
maintain.2 32
B.

Quebecois and Inuit within Canada

Canada is organized along the lines of traditional federations except
for two of its thirteen provinces and territories-which are ethnically
distinct from the rest of the nation. The Francophone population of
229. Andre Lecours, The Ibarretxe Plan:A New Formalism, 6 McGiLL INT'L REv. 22
(2005), availableat http://www.irsam.ca/mir/Lecours%5B22-26%5D.pdf
230. Id. See also Jorge Martinez-Paoletti, Rights and Duties of Minorities in a
Context of Post-ColonialSelf-Determination: Basques and Catalans in Contemporary
Spain, 15 BUFF. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 159 (2009).
231. Organic Law 6/2006 of the 19' of July, on the Reform of the Statute of
Autonomy of Catalonia, available at www.parlament.cat/porteso/estatut/estatut
angles 100506.pdf.
232. Martinez-Paoletti, supra note 230.
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Quebec and the Native population of Nunavut each have their own
regional polity and enjoy the accompanying constitutionally mandated
political representation in the federal parliament in Ottawa. 233 The
Quebecois have maintained their separate status in a province since the
federation's founding, 2 34 whereas the Inuit people have had their territory
only since it was carved out of the Northwest Territories in 1999.235
The difference between province versus territory within the
Canadian federation is not a dispositive one per se. Instead, it goes to the
source of power or inherent jurisdiction that the regional government
wields. Provinces are recognized in the Canadian constitution as such
and their authority stems from that document. Territories, on the other
hand, are creations of the federal government and derive their authority
from the federal government by extension instead of from the federal
constitution itself.2 3 6
The Canadian federal government has long acknowledged the
unique status of French-Canadians within the federation. In November
of 2006, the House of Commons passed (by a wide margin) a motion by
Prime Minister Stephen Harper which stated "[t]hat this House recognize
that the Quebecois form a nation within a united Canada." 23 7 There is
on-going debate about what exactly this statement entails. It would
appear to acknowledge the Quebecois as a distinct group of Canadians,
i.e. a nation as a people, not a nation as a state. The fact that there was

233. Geoff Gilbert, Autonomy and Minority Groups: A Right in InternationalLaw?,
35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 307 (2002).
234. Nathalie Des Rosiers, From Telling to Listening: A TherapeuticAnalysis of the
Role of Courts in Minority-Majority Conflicts, 37 CT. REv. 54, 58 (2000) ("In 1867, the
federal structure that Canada continues to have today was adopted, and the province of
Quebec, with a definite French majority, was created."). See also, A.H.F. LEFROY,
CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 48 (1918).
235. Jeffrey Wutzke, Dependent Independence: Application of the Nunavut Model to
Native Hawaiian Sovereignty and Self-Determination Claims, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REv.
509, 537 (1998) ("On April 1, 1999, the NWT [Northwest Territories] will be split in
two, and a new territory, named Nunavut, will be created. Nunavut will consist of a large
section of mainland North America, and will also include almost the entire Canadian
Arctic archipelago of islands west of Greenland (Kalaallit Nunaat), and all of the islands
within Hudson Bay and James Bay-an area one-sixth that of the entire country of Canada.
Rather than establishing an autonomous region within (or on top of) existing provincial
or territorial boundaries, the Nunavut Territorial Government will have the same rights,
responsibilities, and duties as the Government of the Yukon Territory and the
Government of the NWT.").
236. Compare Nunavut Act, S.C. 1993, c. 28, available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/
PDF/Statute/N/N-28.6.pdf, with The Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3,
availableat http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Canada/English/ca 1867.html.
237. House of Commons Debates, Vol. 141, No. 87, 39t Parliament, 1St Session,
Monday, Nov. 27, 2006, available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/
Publication.aspx?Pub=hansard&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1&Docld=25441
66&File=0#SOB- 1798651.
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widespread support from legislators from all across Canada reinforces
this conclusion.2 38 In other words, the motion was primarily symbolic, as
opposed to an attempt to establish a legal conduit for secession.
To date, this motion has not been assimilated into the Canadian
constitution. As it currently stands, examples of the uniqueness of
Quebec must be found in the more subtle construction of constitutional
provisions. For instance, in outlining the distribution of legislative
powers between the Canadian parliament and the provincial legislatures,
Article 93 provides that education is left to the provinces, "subject and
according to" certain restrictive provisions. 239 This article is immediately
followed by the caveat that these provisions do not apply to Quebec. 240
Judicially, the question of Quebec's special status culminated in the
1998 Supreme Court case regarding the legality of secession under the
constitution.241 In a somewhat non-committal decision, the Court left the
door open for future discourse on secession, while establishing itself as
an authority on how pure democratic expressions (such as popular
referenda) and calls for self-determination should affect the legitimacy of
a constitutional system such as Canada's. 2 4 2
Nevertheless, the Quebecois seem to enjoy a relatively high degree
of autonomy, and their cultural heritage is freely acknowledged and even
protected. As one scholar notes,
Given the strong concessions toward regionalism on matters such as
language, and given that overall economic benefits flowed to rather
than from Quebec, there were not readily credible claims of
oppression of the sort that may have sustained independence claims
in the Baltics under the Soviets or in the broader regions of
Kurdistan, for example." 243
Indeed, some believe that the Canadian parallel should be followed by
the Kurds:
In Canada, the Quebecois, like the Kurds of Iraq, around one fifth of
the state's population, consider themselves a distinct nation with their
own culture... . Quebec has a dominant francophone majority,
which comprises the bulk of Canada's francophones. If applied to
Iraq, the Canadian model would suggest a single federal unit
including most Kurds and in which Kurds form a strong majority....
238. Id.
239. Constitution Act, 1867, Article 93(1).
240. Id.
241. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, available at
http://csc.lexu m.umontreal.calen/1998/1998rcs2-217/1998rcs2-217.html.
242. Id.
243. Samuel Issacharoff, Democracy and Collective Decisionmaking, INT'L J. OF
CONsT'L L. (forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract-1031080.
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What evidence is available from Iraq suggests that a federation
structured like Canada's would be more likely to secure agreement,
and more in keeping with self-determination principles, than one that
divides the Kurdish homeland into several units, or the Kurds'
preferred model of a two-unit federation of Kurdistan and 'Arabstan.'
The Canadian model would allow Kurdistan to continue to be
governed as a single national unit, as its leaders and people want.244
In addition to the Quebecois, the Canadian federal constitution
expressly addresses native peoples. Article 35 preserves the "existing
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada,"
including the Inuit.24 5 Moreover, Article 35.1 ensures that parts of the
constitution applicable to aboriginal peoples will not be amended without
first holding a constitutional conference on the issue, to which
representatives of these peoples will be invited.246
Because Nunavut is a territory, not a province, the federal
government can take a more direct role in governance. But this is a
dormant power that Ottawa has not sought to actively wield. One might
assume that because the federal minister of Indian Affairs appoints a
commissioner who acts as Nunavut's chief executive officer, an
unusually low level of self-government results.
In fact, the
commissioner's role is largely symbolic, so that supposition would be
based on form over substance. A premier serves under the commissioner
who is elected from among the individually elected members of the
unicameral territorial parliament known as the Legislative Assembly of
Nunavut. It is the premier's government that largely runs day to day
*
247
operations within the territory.
C.

Ethnic Minorities within Russia

The Russian Federation asserts that it is a "democratic, federal, ruleof-law state, with a republican form of government."248 Geographically
the largest state in the world, the Russian federation is subdivided into 83
constituent elements; however these do not all share the same degree of
autonomy from the central government. 2 4 9 The 21 ethnically distinct
244. John McGarry, Canadian Lessons for Iraq, in THE FUTuRE OF KURDISTAN IN
IRAQ 92, at 94-97 (Brendan O'Leary, John McGarry, & Khaled Saleh eds. 2005).
245. Constitution Act, 1982 (Canada), available at http://www.solon.org/
Constitutions/Canada/English/ca l982.html.
246. Id.
247. See Nunavut Act, supra note 236; Nunavut Government information, available
at http://www.gov.nu.ca/english/cabinet/.
248. Jeffrey Kahn, Vladimir Putin and the Rule of Law in Russia, 36 GA J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 511, 512 n.3 (2008).
249. Henry E. Hale, Will Elections Erode Russia's Democracy?, 24.1 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 123, 124 (2000).
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republics within the Russian federal system enjoy the most selfdetermination. 2 5 0 Not only are they guaranteed their own official
language under the Russian constitution,25 1 they have their own
constitutions and parliamentary assemblies.252 Unlike the other units
within the Russian federation that have executives appointed by
Moscow, the Republics each elect their own presidents-although they
are represented in international affairs by the central government.2 53
Internally, the ethnic republics, along with the other units of the
federation are represented in the upper house of the federal parliamentthe Federation Council. 254 As is the case with most parliamentary upper
chambers, this is the weaker of the two in the bicameral system. As the
Russian federation emerged from the collapse of communism in the early
1990s, the republics were able to assert their independence more freely:
[Russia's] system of ethnic federalism promoted a degree of regional
autonomy and minority control over regional politics, particularly
during the 1990s when President Boris Yeltsin ruled over a system of
asymmetrical federalism that provided rather widespread autonomy
to regional elites in non-Russian regions. 255
However, this has become less and less the case as Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin and, perhaps to a lesser extent, President Dmitry
Medvedev, have centralized federal power over the last ten years. 256
For example, the July 2001 Law on Political Parties requires
organizations to have at least 10,000 members nationwide and regional
party organizations in at least 45 of Russia's 89 republics. Russia's
ethnic minorities are generally too small and/or geographically
concentrated to meet this standard, including even the largest minority,
the Tatars. Russia lacks any one major minority group; rather, it is

250. G. Alan Tarr, Creating Federalism in Russia, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 689, 701
(1999).
251. KoNSTITUTSIIA RossIisKoI FEDERATSII [KoNST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 68.
252. KoNST. RF art. 5(2).
253. Hale, supra note 249.
254. KONST. RF art. 95.
255. Michael P. Dennis and Robert G. Moser, The Voting Behavior of Islamic
Minorities in a FledglingDemocracy: The Case of Russia (2009), http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1450282.
256. Alexander N. Domrin, From Fragmentationto Balance: The Shifting Model of
Federalism in Post-Soviet Russia, 15 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 515, 549
(2006) ("The Russian federal government has taken a number of measures aimed at the
elimination of 'ethno-territorial federalism' in the country. Specifically these measures
are aimed at changing the status of ethnic republics and bringing them down to the level
of ordinary Russian regions. As provided by Federal Law No. 159-FZ of December
2004, the RF President has the power to remove regional leaders, including "presidents"
of ethnic "republics.").
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composed of dozens of very small groups, only three of which comprise
more than one percent of the total population.257
Another example is the re-issuance of the constitution for the
republic of Chechnya. A mostly Islamic republic in the Caucasus,
Chechnya has had its share of violent interaction with the central
government-most notably in the late 1990s as a civil war broke out
inflaming separatist tension in the region. The new constitution, which
was approved in 2003, deletes the word sovereignty from the text (it
appears in the text of other republics' constitutions), declares Chechnya
part of the Russian federation, allows the federation president to sack the
Chechen president at any time, and asserts a strong hold over the
Chechen judiciary by subordinating the republic's prosecution office to
that of the federal prosecution apparatus.2 58
Thus, while constitutionally mandated, the power of ethnic
republics in Russia tends to fluctuate with the power of the central
government. This is clearly not a model the Kurds wish to emulate as
they move forward in the new Iraqi federation. But, the Kurds have been
successful enough in lodging sufficient autonomy provisions in the Iraqi
federal constitution that they would enjoy more legal breaking power
than the Russian republics. Nevertheless, whether that would be
sufficient to discourage a political attempt at consolidated control in
Baghdad, as was the case with Moscow, is unclear.
CONCLUSION
Over the long term, people who do not wish to live together
shouldn't be made to do so. The pages of geographic history are littered
with fragments of empires, colonial territories and artificial states that
once contained multi-ethnic populations who, when given the chance,
seized an opportunity to break free. Modem Iraq exemplifies the latter.
Its neighboring states are keen to keep it together, as is the U.S. Iraq's
Kurds have long dreamed of charting their own destiny in the world-a
dream that may yet come true. But for now, they have settled for what
amounts to full autonomy within a federal system whereby they control
their own borders, security, economy, and natural resource base.
The regional constitution they have devised is designed to fit handin-glove with Iraq's federal constitution. The Kurds cleverly pressed for
certain provisions in the federal constitution that, when activated, would
secure for them an even greater share of sovereignty-return of Kirkuk,
257. Id. at 7.
258. Compare Chechnya Constitution 1992, availableat http://www.servat.unibe.ch/
icl/cc01000_.html, with Chechnya Constitution 2003, available at http://www.servat.
unibe.ch/iclcc00000_ .html.
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control of non-producing oilfields, preservation of pre-existing Kurdish
laws, and regional control over subjects not expressly included in the
federal government's limited area of legislation. The Kurdish regional
constitution's provisions fit precisely into those holes negotiated into the
federal constitution.
Not surprisingly, the central government does not like this and is
resisting Kurdistan's progressively dogged insistence that Baghdad
adhere to the terms of its own constitution. The Kurdish regional
government wins the legal argument because it carefully laid the
groundwork to do so. But, it may yet lose the political argument if it
presses too hard and loses the backing of key foreign and domestic
constituencies. The Kurds must tread carefully as America withdraws its
military presence and Iraq takes fuller control over its internal affairs.
The Kurds have achieved much since the 1991 uprising, and even
more since the last days of Saddam. It would be a shame for them to
throw it all away in an over-ambitious fit of nationalism. However, the
patience with which they successfully navigated the U.S. occupation and
the early days of the federation bodes well for them. Their ability to
"work the system" from within the system to advance their cause will
carry them forward dramatically if they let it.
Over 900 years ago, another Kurd cleverly rose to prominence
within an Islamic political/military system dominated by Arabs and
Turks. His name was Saladin. In the end, he commanded the entire
Near East and defeated the Pope's persistent Crusaders in the 12 th
Century. The old saying up in the desolate highlands where they live,
that "the Kurd has no friend but the mountain" may be true. But the
Kurd has survived, despite all odds. And the Kurd continues to thrive in
a land surrounded by enemies. Patience and courage are the qualities
that will see them peacefully through this re-founding of the state of Iraq.
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APPENDIX
KURDISTAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY-IRAQ

Draft of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region's
Constitution Project
2 2 nd

August 2006

[21st Kharmanan, 2706 Kurdish Year]

In the Name of God the Most Merciful, the Most Gracious
Preamble
We, the people of Iraqi Kurdistan have been oppressed for decades
by a dictatorial regime which monopolized all kinds of power. A regime
that deprived us of freedom and all those natural rights God bestowed
upon humans. The regime found out that all the civilized, political,
economical, social and cultural rights recognized inside the international
treaties are too much for us.
Unlike those peoples derived from the Ottoman Empire who
immediately after the First World War received benefit from the
Fourteen Principles presented by the American President Woodrow
Wilson; we have become victims of international interests by being
deprived of our rights to self-determination and deciding for ourselves
the limits of our political and legal bases.
Articles 62, 63 and 64 of the Sevres Treaty (1920) recognized the
self-determination rights of the people of Kurdistan, but that right was
rescinded in the Lausanne Treaty (1923). Then the League of Nations
realized that South Kurdistan (later labeled as Iraqi Kurdistan) has never
been a part of Arab Iraq and there is no historical evidence backing the
demands and requests of the neighboring countries. The maps drawn by
Europeans in the 16ffi and 20f centuries refute those historical books and
maps written and drawn by the ancient Arab historians and
demographers. Europeans realized that the Iraqi northern border does
not pass Hamrin Mountain and Kurdistan has never been a part of
Anatolia, which also refutes those requests. Additionally, they have
annexed Kurdistan to Arab Iraq for some international interests without
questioning us, or taking our opinions.
When the Iraqi Government partially recognized some of our rights
in a statement published on 30th May 1932, those obligations received
international recognition; however, the government prevented
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implementation of Article 10, without seeking the approval of the
League of Nations to either amend or omit the obligation. And although
the commitment of the Iraqi Government remained valid after the United
Nations was formed, it remained only as ink on paper.
The policy of suppression increased year after year for eighty years.
Nothing from the international declarations and treaties; which always
hailed justice, freedom and equal opportunities and which were included
in the successive Iraqi Constitutions of: 1925, 1958, 1964, 1968, 1970
and the 1990 draft; was able to stop or decrease that policy. As a result,
the sequential Iraqi governments crossed all the red lines and in besides
not recognizing our rights; they conducted genocides and ethnic
cleansing policies; demolished and destroyed approximately 4,500
villages, and changed the demography of almost all the parts of
Kurdistan by forcibly displacing the people of Kurdistan from those
towns and villages which were left undestroyed in order to change those
villages' nationality. They (the former Iraqi governments) conducted
ethnic cleansing policies through the use of chemical weapons in Halabja
city, Balisan and the Badinan area and many other areas. Thousands of
young Faily Kurdish people were driven towards death, chemical
experiment and mass graves, after these martyrs' families were displaced
outside of Iraq and had their national identity taken. This was followed
by a campaign to kill Barzani people and the so-called notorious Anfal
campaign that killed 182,000 Kurdish civilians including the young and
old, women and innocent children.
The hatred, atrocities, oppression, annihilation and genocides
conducted against us by the Iraqi rulers, inspired within us a
revolutionary spirit and made our ancestors' path of defending our
existence, stronger and brighter and pushed us to respond to the instinct
for survival. For eighty years our revolutions, uprisings and struggles
followed these inhumane acts. During that time, if any opportunity came
forward our leaders never failed to ask for peace but, all the former Iraqi
rulers oppressed us in one hand, and ignored their promises in the other.
That was the callous essence of the government's path, traditions
and policies. The best evidence is the abolition of the June Treaty in
1966, and hiding from the March Treaty of 1970, and signing the
doomed Algiers Treaty in March 1975, which paved the way to dominate
the Kurdish movement, but without success. Shortly afterwards, the
Kurdish movement was revived and waged the 1991 uprising which led
to the exodus to the neighboring countries and which rocked the world.
Then on 5th April 1991, the United Nations Security Council Resolution
number 688 was issued, and as a result, the Coalition Forces of the
Second Gulf War were based in Kurdistan and saved us from an
unknown fate.
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We seized the opportunity and held the first Parliamentary elections
on 19th May 1992, and formed the first government on 5 July 1992,
followed by the formation of the Judicial Authority. Shortly afterwards,
the Parliament decreed its well-known declaration regarding the
federalism of Kurdistan in its relation to any Iraqi central government;
labeling Iraq as a Federal Republic, democratic, parliamentary, and
plurality. This is according to our legitimate rights to self-determination.
For this we have relied on the United Nations Treaty, the International
Conventions on Civil and Political Rights and the International Treaty on
Cultural, Economic and Social Rights which was issued by the UN in
1966, and joined by Iraq on 25th January 1971.
Our hope was renewed when Iraq was freed from the atrocious
dictatorial regime and the decision was made to govern Iraq through a
transitional period while establishing a Federal Iraq. Then on the same
principles the permanent Iraqi constitution was written.

Most of the Iraqi peoples ratified the constitution of Federalism in a
poll held on 15th October 2005, which substantiated the Kurdish choice
in diagnosing an appropriate governing system for Iraq including both
major nations, Kurds and Arabs with other nationalities such as:
Turkomans, Chaldeans, Assyrians and Armenians; as well as various
religions such as: Islam, Christianity, Ezidis, Suby and Mandaean. They
all receive benefit by the establishment of a federal country which would
be stronger and more conscious of achieving justice, security, freedom,
democracy and equity among all the nations and religions.
So we feel all the oppression, annihilation and sufferings were
perpetrated against our generations. We respect the symbolic leaders of
the Kurdistan Freedom Movement, the Peshmerga and those martyrs
who sacrificed their lives for the freedom of Kurdistan, its legitimate
rights and its right to self-determination. Under the auspices of the
International Declaration of Human Rights, the international treaties and
conventions, a democratic society has emerged in the Kurdistan Region,
based on social justice where the human rights of all nations and
religions are provided for. And the citizens in Iraqi Kurdistan are
enabled to form a unified and democratic Region while building an Iraq
where our will would be unified with the will of all the Iraqi people and
its national and political forces on the grounds of a federal, democratic
and parliamentary Iraq which believes in human rights and pluralism.
Because of all those reasons mentioned above, we have initiated this
constitution.
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CHAPTER ONE
Major Principles
ARTICLE 1:
The Kurdistan Region is a "Federal" Region within the Federal Iraqi
state. Its political system is republican, parliamentary and democratic
system which is based on political pluralism, sharing power peacefully
and the principle of separating powers.
ARTICLE 2:
First: Iraqi Kurdistan includes: Duhok Governorate with its
current administrative border, Kirkuk, Suleimaniyah and Hawler
Govemorates with the 1968 border; Akre, Shekhan, Sinjar, Tal Afar,
Talkeif and Qaraqush Districts; Zumar, Bashiqa and Aski Kalak Subdistricts of Nineveh Governorate; Khanaqin and Mandali districts of
Diyala Governorate; Badra district and Jassan Sub-district in Wasit
Governorate, with their administrative border before 1968.
Second: To determine the Kurdistan Region's administrative
borders, we depend on Article 140 in the Federal Constitution.
Third: Those areas that are returned to the Kurdistan Region
according to Article 140 of the Federal Constitution, shall fairly receive
benefit (as do all the other people of Kurdistan), from those rights, duties
and protections mentioned in this constitution.
ARTICLE 3:
There is no way for building a new region inside the border of the
Iraqi Kurdistan Region.
ARTICLE 4:
First: The People are the source of authority and the base of their
legitimacy is practiced through the constitutional institutions. The
constitution and laws of the Kurdistan Region are more sovereign and
supreme than those passed by the Iraqi Government except for those
fields related to the authority of the Iraqi Government mentioned in
Article 110 of the Iraqi Federal Constitution.
Second: If the laws of the Kurdistan Region contradict with other
laws, the Courts of Kurdistan should follow the Constitution and laws of
Kurdistan, unless the law is abolished or amended by the Parliament or
invalidated by the Constitutional Court.
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ARTICLE 5:
The Kurdistan Parliament has the right to apply any law passed by
the Iraqi Federal Republic, even if the law is not mentioned in the limited
authorities in the Article 110 of the Federal Constitution, if that law
serves the interest of the people of Kurdistan. This shall be organized by
law.
ARTICLE 6:
First: The people of Iraqi Kurdistan consists of Kurds and other
nationalities (Turkomans, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Armenians and Arabs)
and according to law, they are all citizens of the Region.
Second: The authorities of the Region have the right to regulate the
rights of citizenship in the Region according to the law.
ARTICLE 7:
This constitution asserts the Muslim identity of the majority of the
people of Kurdistan and the principles of Islamic Shari'a (i.e. The
Islamic Law) is one of the sources of legislation. It also secures all the
rights of Christians and Ezidis and other religions regarding the freedom
of belief and practicing religion.
ARTICLE 8:
The people of Iraqi Kurdistan have the right of self-determination.
Accordingly, they are free in determining their political status and
pursuing economic, social and cultural growth. They have freely chosen
a union with Iraq and its people, land and sovereignty while it commits
to a Federal Constitution and a federal, parliamentary, plurality and
democratic system that respect the human rights of individuals and the
community. They may reconsider themselves in selecting their future
and political base in the cases below:
First: Violation of the dignity of the Federal Constitution, by the
recession of the commitment to the federal system or the major
constitutional principles of democracy and the human rights of
individuals and the community.
Second: Practicing discriminatory policies and changing the
demography of Kurdistan, or maintaining traces of the previous policies
which are retroactive from the constitutional commitment of Article 140
of the Federal Constitution.
ARTICLE 9:
A major and constitutional right of the Region should:
First: Take the opinion of the Region before signing any contract
and convention between the Federal Government and any state or foreign
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entity relevant to the situation or the current or future rights of the
Kurdistan Region.
Second: The Region, within its authorities, is entitled to pass those
laws which are outside the limited authorities of the Federal
Government, has the right to sign agreements with the government of
territories of foreign states.
Third: The Region, within its authorities, is entitled to pass those
laws which are outside the limited authority of the federal government,
has the right; with the approval of the Federal Government to sign deals,
and the federal Government should not disapprove those agreements
without legal justification.
ARTICLE 10:
The major and constitutional rights of the Region are:
First: The Region shall have a fair share from the federal revenues
based upon the population, and taking into consideration some acts
perpetrated against Kurdistan such as burning, destruction and depriving
its people of their legitimate rights during the eras of the former regimes.
Second: Participation in the federal positions and institutions on an
equitable basis.
Third: The citizens of the Region shall receive the ratings of
employment in the federal institutions in the Kurdistan Region.
ARTICLE 11:
Hawler city [Erbil] is the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan; and the
Parliament has the right to designate another city of the Region as the
capital.
ARTICLE 12:
First: The Kurdistan Region has a special flag which is hoisted side
by side with the Federal Iraqi flag; and it has its own anthem and national
feast (Nawroz); which are organized by law.
Second: The Kurdistan flag consists of red, white and green colors
with a 21- beamed yellow drawing of the sun in the center.
Third: The medals, badges of honor and formal holidays are
organized by law.
ARTICLE 13:
The Kurdistan Region has a Peshmarga Defensive Force to protect
the Region and its structure, duties and works. The force is organized by
law. Armed militias may not be formed outside of the basis of law.
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ARTICLE 14:
First: Kurdish and Arabic are the two official languages in the
Region, and this Constitution guarantees the rights of citizens of the
Region in to teach their children in their mother tongue, such as:
Turkoman, Syriac, and Armenian; in the governmental education
institutions according to the educational procedures.
Second: In addition to the Kurdish and Arabic languages, the
Turkoman and Syriac languages are official in those administrative units
where people form the majority in speaking in the Turkoman and Syriac
languages. This shall be organized by law.
Third: To define a formal language, Article 4 of the Federal
Constitution will be applied if there is a basis to implement it in the
Region.
ARTICLE 15:
The Kurdistan Region depends on a free market economic system
and does not allow monopolies and exploitations, and provides for free
and legitimate competitions.
ARTICLE 16:
The Regional Government sponsors economic reform of the Region
on the basis of the modern economic principles for reviving the
economical infrastructure and development and encouraging investment
in the various sectors. And that is organized by law.
ARTICLE 17:
First: The public wealth in the Region is the property of the people
of Kurdistan and is organized by law to protect and manage it; and the
conditions for disposing it are all organized by law.
Second: The natural resources, surface and underground water
unextracted minerals, quarries and mines are national resources for the
Region. Their extraction, management and disposal are organized by
law to protect the interests of current and future generations.
CHAPTER TWO
PART ONE
The Civil and Political Rights
ARTICLE 18:
Citizens are equal before the law in rights and duties without
discrimination based on race, gender, color, language, social background,
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religion, sect, economical and social condition, or political and
intellectual affiliations.
ARTICLE 19:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security, and no one
should have these rights denied or restricted, except by law according to
a special judicial decision.
ARTICLE 20:
Equal opportunity is a right granted to for all citizens of the Region,
and the authorities of the Region shall take appropriate procedures to
achieve that.
ARTICLE 21:
Women are equal with men and discrimination against women is
prohibited. The Regional Government guarantees them all the civil and
political rights mentioned in this Constitution as well as in those
international treaties and conventions ratified by the Iraqi state. All
obstacles which hinder their equality in cultural, social, economic and
political lives, shall be removed.
ARTICLE 22:
First: Education is a right that the Regional Government provides
for everyone without discrimination. The elementary teaching stage is
compulsory and the Kurdistan Regional Government commits to
eradicate illiteracy among all ages, the male and the female.
Second: The Regional Government provides free education in the
primary, secondary and high schools, universities, technical and
vocational institutes. It also commits to developing and encouraging
scientific research aimed at peaceful and civil objectives, and sponsors
success, invention, novelty and all kinds of creativity.
Third: Private education is organized by law.
ARTICLE 23:
First: The citizens of the Region have the right to participate in
running public affairs directly or by their freely elected representatives;
and to participate in the general elections, referenda, municipal, local
council and private corporation elections. They have the right to hold
public positions according to law and based on equal opportunity.
Second: No less than 25% of the seats are reserved for women in
the elections of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region Parliament, local councils and
municipalities.
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ARTICLE 24:
Punishments are personal, the freedom and dignity of humans are
protected.
ARTICLE 25:
There is neither crime nor punishment except by law. No act is
considered a crime if the law does not consider it a crime at the time of
the act. There is no way to impose a tougher punishment on a criminal
than that which is allowed at the time of the criminal act.
ARTICLE 26:
Justice in front of a competent court is a guaranteed right for all.
ARTICLE 27:
The accused is not guilty unless the crime is proved through a legal
and just trial against him.
ARTICLE 28:
According to the rules of law, the right of self-defense is available
through all stages of investigation and trial.
ARTICLE 29:
All people in the judicial and administrative procedures have the
right to be dealt with based on justice; there is no way to use bad conduct
against them, or to torture them psychologically and physically, or use
inhumane conduct against them. It is prohibited to use force, threat,
promises and torture against somebody in order to coerce a confession.
If this is violated one may ask for compensations for the psychological
and physical damages, and the rate of the compensation is limited by
law.
ARTICLE 30:
Law shall have no retroactive effect unless stated by law, except for
those laws relevant to taxes.
ARTICLE 31:
The punishment law has no retroactive effect, unless it serves the
interests of the accused.
ARTICLE 32:
Criminal investigators shall present the preliminary investigation
file to a competent judge in no more than 24 hours from the time the
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criminal is arrested, and that period may only be extended once for the
same duration.
ARTICLE 33:
First: No one may be arrested and confined, jailed or sentenced
without a competent judicial order as regulated by law.
Second: Arrest, detention and imprisonment are prohibited outside
those locations specified by law. Those locations shall be observed by
health and social supervisors and shall be under the control of the
governmental agencies.
ARTICLE 34:
The court, shall appoint a defense attorney for the accused in both
the investigation and trial, if the accused is not able to obtain a defense
attorney.
ARTICLE 35:
First: Homes and residential places shall have their privacy
respected and not violated; and shall not be entered and inspected, nor
monitored except as determined by law.
Second: No person or their belongings may be searched, except as
provided by law.
ARTICLE 36:
One who is arrested should be immediately informed of the reason
for their arrest and the crime of which they are accused.
ARTICLE 37:
There should be no discrimination toward prisoners regarding their
race, color, gender, religion, political affiliation, social matters, birth
place, wealth, or any other reasons.
ARTICLE 38:
The religious beliefs, moral principles and ethics of the prisoner are
to be respected.
ARTICLE 39:
Submitting complaints and petitions to the authorities of the Region
is a legitimate right of citizens. The authorities have no more than fifteen
days to decide on the matter; and if they do not receive the complaint or
petition, or do not decide on it without having an appropriate
justification, they shall be investigated according to law.
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ARTICLE 40:
The political refugees may not be forcibly sent back to their country
of origin.
ARTICLE 41:
The Government of Iraqi Kurdistan guarantees protection to the
families of the martyrs of the Kurdistan Freedom Movement, the
Peshmerga, the Anfal and chemical bombardment victims and its
handicapped victims.
ARTICLE 42:
No entity or group shall be allowed involvement in chauvinism,
fascism, racism, terrorism, Takfeeriyeens (i.e. Expiators) and ethnic
cleansing, nor encourage or promote them, glorify them, or promote their
justifications. Iraqi Kurdistan Authorities shall fight terrorism and strive
to protect the land of the Region lest it should be a stronghold, or safe
haven for their activities.
PART TWO
The Economical, Social and Educational Rights
ARTICLE 43:
Employment is the right of everyone. People must be provided with
the means of living through jobs they choose of their own free choice.
ARTICLE 44:
The Regional Government establishes programs for the vocational
and artistic trainings and instructions to generate employment
opportunities.
ARTICLE 45:
Workers are entitled to equal benefit for equal work. As regulated
by law, the relationship between the employee and the employer shall be
based on economic bases while observing for social justice regulations
and protecting the employees from exploitation.
ARTICLE 46:
Employees have equal rights in promotion opportunities in their
jobs for no other basis but seniority and competence.

782

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 114:3

ARTICLE 47:
The Regional Government guarantees the right to establish
syndicates and vocational unions and to freely affiliate with them, as
regulated by law.
ARTICLE 48:
Private property is protected. No one's property may be
expropriated except for public benefit, and the compensation should be
quick and fair and provided to the owner before disposition of the
property or at the time of seizure. This shall be regulated by law.
ARTICLE 49:
Family is a natural, social, and fundamental unit in society. It has the
right to protection by society and the Government. Therefore:
First: A marriage bond may not be completed without the consent
of the couple to be married willingly and without force.
Second: The Government protects motherhood, childhood and the
old aged people and establishes a consultancy council for family affairs.
Third: Children have the right to be educated and supervised by
their parents and parents have the right to be respected and cared for by
their children; specifically in cases of need, old age and disability.
Fourth: Economic exploitation of children is prohibited and the
Government shall take necessary measures to protect them.
Fifth: All forms of discrimination, violence and abuse in the
society, family and school shall be prohibited.
Sixth: The Regional Government shall provide shelters to protect
and to take care of women who have lost family security because of
social reasons.
ARTICLE 50:
All have the right to health care. The Regional Government must
provide means of prevention and treatment and according to its
capabilities provide for those families which, due to imperative
circumstances, lost their source of income due to disease, disability, loss
of spouse and old age.
ARTICLE 51:
First: The Regional Government takes care of public health and
commits to it by building hospitals, health centers, and social care
centers for elderly people and provides means of prevention and
treatment.
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Second: Individuals and civil firms can build private hospitals and
care centers under the supervision of special establishments of the
Regional Government, and this is regulated by law.
ARTICLE 52:
First: The handicapped and disabled people have the right to be
respected as humans. Whatever the cause of their case is, they still have
the same rights as others have. And they have the right to live a decent
life according to their capabilities.
The handicapped have the right to medical and
Second:
psychological treatment, education, employment and access to artificial
limbs, enabling them to get tools and all that improves their capabilities
so that they may reintegrate with society.
Third: The handicapped have the right to have their special needs
taken into account for all of the economic and social planning.
Fourth: The handicapped have the right to be protected from all
forms of exploitation, or any kind of system or action that is
discriminatory or unfair or degrades their dignity.
Fifth: The Regional Government shall demonstrate interest in
gestures and mimics language and in the Braille reading and writing
method language for the needy handicapped.
ARTICLE 53:
The Regional Government takes care of the Kurdistan universities,
and protects their campuses, and respects their moral identity within the
law.
ARTICLE 54:
First: The Regional Government sponsors science, literature and
the arts and encourages scientific research.
Second: All people have the right to participate in cultural life and
enjoy the benefits from the application of scientific developments; and to
receive benefit from the legal protection for the intellectual property
resulting from any artistic, literary or scientific work.
Third: All people have the right to be free in scientific research and
creative activities.
Fourth: The Regional Government provides the protection of
innovation property, design, sample, trademarks, brands, art and
scientific intellectual property rights.
ARTICLE 55:
Kurdistan Regional
youngsters through:

Government

takes care

of youths

and
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First: Protecting them from exploitation and delinquency.
Second: Developing their skills, enhancing their capabilities and
encouraging their activities.
Third: Educating them, enhancing their moral and national values
and encouraging their initiative, awareness of their nation's cultural,
historical, national and militant heritage and the national sense of
awareness within them.
Fourth: Providing them with opportunities so that they may invest
their humanitarian skills in the economic, social and educational projects.
Fifth: Promoting plans for youth through which they take
responsibility and play their roles in society.
Sixth: Encouraging individual and group initiatives and sponsor
their creativity and establish appropriate centers to morally and
materially supervise and support them.
Seventh: Encouraging cooperative spirit, team work, democratic
practice, and providing them with tools in their leisure times to further
improve their skills and productive capabilities.
ARTICLE 56:
Sport is a legitimate right for all and the Regional Government has
to encourage athletic activities and provide athletic equipment.
ARTICLE 57:
First: Environmental protection (land, water, air, plants and
animals) is a responsibility of all and if anyone causes damage to them,
they are responsible to fix it and to be punished by law.
Second: All citizens have a legitimate right for freedom and
equality in an appropriate living status, in a social and economical
environment which will provide a prosperous and happy life and has a
responsibility for protecting the environment and improving it for the
present and future generations.
Third: The Regional Government shall take action to mitigate and
treat the sources of pollution in the environment, and in regard to this it,
strives to develop forests and protect the fields and protect the green
zones inside the cities and their outskirts. The Regional Government
shall develop, enlarge and construct public parks, natural parks for
protecting animals, plants, and natural resources and prohibit buildings
and institutions and the use of machines and instruments in the natural
protectorates.
ARTICLE 58:
The Regional Government takes necessary procedures into account
to protect and encourage consumers so that they may defend themselves
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according to the law, and to establish unions and associations for this
purpose.
PART THREE
Freedoms
ARTICLE 59:
Everyone has freedom of speech and self expression.
ARTICLE 60:
The Regional Government guarantees the rights of freedom of the
press, publishing, printing, assembly, peaceful demonstration and strikes,
as shall be regulated by law.
ARTICLE 61:
The freedom of communication and exchanging correspondence via
the post, telephone, and E-mails is protected and these may not be
monitored, wiretapped, or revealed except in necessary cases of law and
security, which shall be according to a judicial decision.
ARTICLE 62:
The citizens of the Kurdistan Region are free to travel and settle
outside the Region or to return to it.
ARTICLE 63:
Everyone who is legally in the Region has the right to move freely,
and to choose a place of residence, and there shall be no restriction for
this right except in cases to protect national security or public traditions,
public health, or the rights and freedoms of others.
ARTICLE 64:
The Regional Government is committed to enhancing the role of
civil organizations and supporting, developing, and protecting their
independence to achieve their goals as shall be regulated by law.
ARTICLE 65:
Religion is not compulsory. Everyone is free in religious, belief and
thought.
The Regional Government provides citizens (Muslims,
Christians, Ezidis and others) with freedom to practice their worship,
rites, and religious ceremonies, and to respect and develop mosques,
churches and other places of worships.
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ARTICLE 66:
Any sort of compulsory or forced work shall be prohibited.
Dismissing people from work may not be exercised:
First: As a compulsory means, because of a political orientation, or
as a punishment for political beliefs, or views, or declaration of such
views, which are opposite to the social, economic or political system.
Second: As a way to gather effective labor force and using them for
the purpose of economic growth.
Third: As a punishment for political party participation.
Fourth: As a means to ethnic, social, national, religious, creed or
political discriminations.
ARTICLE 67:
First: The freedom to establish associations, political parties, or to
affiliate with a party shall be regulated by law.
Second: No one may be compelled to be affiliated with a party or
association, or compelled to continue or discontinue their membership.
Third: The associations and political parties shall be committed to
the principles of democracy in managing their organization, their
structure and the rights of membership.
Fourth: A political party may not be a branch of a foreign party, or
related to the interests of a foreign political party.
Fifth: The parties and associations in their platform, Bylaws and
practices are committed to the principles of the basic rights mentioned in
this Constitution, and to accept others' views pluralism and reject
violence.
Sixth: The parties, organizations, associations and individuals are
not allowed to use any part of a religion or a religious ceremony as a way
to degrade the political and social standing of others, in order to achieve
their goals or for electoral gains.
Seventh: The associations whose acts and goals are against criminal
law and who practice a position contradictory to the political system of
the Region, or affect the peaceful coexistence between the national and
religious components of the people of Kurdistan, are prohibited.
ARTICLE 68:
Everyone has the right to participate in meetings and peaceful
associations, and according to the law no restrictions are imposed on this
right.
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ARTICLE 69:
Conventions, agreements and international declarations regarding
human rights ratified or joined by Iraq are complementary provisions of
this Constitution.
ARTICLE 70:
Foreigners enjoy those freedoms and rights decided in the
international treaties, convention and agreements which the Iraqi Federal
Republic has ratified; in return, the foreigners should take the duties
inside them into account.
ARTICLE 71:
Practice of the rights and freedoms provided in this Constitution
shall not be limited or restricted except by law, provided that those
restrictions and limitations do not affect the essence of the right or
freedom to an extent that a society built on the just, free and democratic
principles accepts them.
PART FOUR
Duties
ARTICLE 72:
Defending the homeland, the safety of its land, protecting its
constitutional establishments, national unity and integrity, and
commitment to the typical victories of the Kurdistan people and struggles
for freedom and democracy, are sacred duties that every citizen should
bear.
ARTICLE 73:
Commitment to the Constitution and the laws and respecting the
public discipline are duties on all the citizens in the Region.
ARTICLE 74:
Respecting and honoring the symbols of Kurdish liberation
movement, its revolutions, martyrs, and protecting the dignity and jobs
of people, the old Peshmerga and struggles are sacred duties of the
Government and the citizens of Kurdistan.
ARTICLE 75:
Protection of the public property and wealth, and respecting the
rights of others' property are duties of all the citizens.
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ARTICLE 76:
Everyone shall support and contribute in the public expenditure
through paying taxes and due tariffs according to laws.
ARTICLE 77:
Anyone who assumes an official position or a public job should
carry out his duties honestly, with honor and discipline.
CHAPTER THREE
The Authorities of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region
ARTICLE 78:
The Authorities of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region include:
First: The Legislature Authority (Kurdistan Parliament)
Second: The Executive Authority.
Third: The Judiciary Authority.
PART ONE
The Legislative Authority (Kurdistan Parliament)
ARTICLE 79:
The Kurdistan Parliament is the legislative authority in the Region
and constitutes the absolute power to decide on issues of supreme
importance to the people of Kurdistan Region; and the Members of
Parliament are representatives of the people and shall be elected by
public, free, secret and direct elections.
ARTICLE 80:
First: The method of electing the Members of the Iraqi Kurdistan
Parliament, term limits, proportions of representation in the Parliament,
the conditions of elections and the members shall be organized by law.
The Parliament structure should reflect a fair
Second:
representation of the nationalities of the Kurdistan Region.
Third: The Member of Parliament is a representative of the Iraqi
Kurdistan peoples including all nationalities, political groups, and
religious organizations, regardless the member's constituency.
ARTICLE 81:
First: The term of Parliament is four years and it starts working
after its first session.
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Second: After announcing the elections results, the President of the
Region should summon the Parliament to hold its first session within
fifteen days; if it has not been summoned to convene within the fifteendays period, the Parliament should hold its session at noon of the
following day.
ARTICLE 82:
The Parliament shall hold its first session under the leadership of the
oldest member, and subsequently through a secret ballot, the
Parliament's President, his Deputy and Secretary General, shall be
elected.
ARTICLE 83:
Parliament Members shall swear this oath before beginning their
duties: "I swear by Almighty God that I shall safeguard the welfare and
interests of the people of Kurdistan, the dignity and integrity of the
Region, the rights and freedoms of its population and to carry out my
duties with absolute honesty and dedication."
ARTICLE 84:
Upon being sworn in, a Parliament Member is considered to have
resigned his previous job; and after ending his period of membership, he
has the right to return to his job, or a similar job to that which he had
before; and the period of membership in the Parliament shall be taken
into account for increasing his salary, promotion and retirement.
ARTICLE 85:
There is no way to exercise the duties of Kurdistan Parliament
memberships, federal Parliament memberships, memberships of local
councils, municipalities or public employment together.
ARTICLE 86:
The Parliament holds two sessions annually. The Parliamentary
Bylaws should stipulate how and when each session should be held.
However, the session in which the general budget is discussed, should
not end before the budget is ratified.
ARTICLE 87:
It is possible to extend the Parliamentary session to conclude
incomplete matters by a maximum of 30 days, upon a request by the
President of the Region, the Prime Minster or 25 Members of Parliament.
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ARTICLE 88:
A quorum is considered present in the Parliament by the presence of
a majority of the Parliamentary members; and the resolutions are decided
by a majority votes of the members if this does not contradict with this
law. And if the votes are equal, the President of the Parliament's vote
shall have the predominant effect.
ARTICLE 89:
Ten or more than ten Members of Parliament may propose a law
draft or resolution.
ARTICLE 90:
First: A Member of Parliament has the right to ask the Prime
Minister, or his Deputy about the activities specifically related to the
Council of Ministers or one of the Ministries and utilizes Parliamentary
regulations and Bylaws in this process.
Second: Ten or more Members of Parliament may ask the Prime
Minister or members of the Council of Ministers questions, and
discussions on the issue should start after eight days as of the arrival of a
request to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. If the discussion
results in a no confidence decision in the Prime Minister or any minister,
a no confidence vote for the Prime Minister should be approved by twothirds of the number of the Parliament members and for any Minister on
the approval of the majority of Parliament Members.
ARTICLE 91:
The rights and privileges of the Parliament's President, the Deputy,
the Secretary General and Members of Parliament shall be organized by
law.
ARTICLE 92:
Laws and Parliamentary Bylaws shall detail the proceedings of
Parliament, its conducting regular and special sessions, termination of
memberships and how vacant seats are to be filled.
ARTICLE 93:
The Parliament practices the following authorities:
First: Resolving the decisive issues of the Iraqi Kurdistan people.
Second: Determining the ratification of suggested amendments to
the Regional Constitution, which requires a two-thirds majority of
Parliament Members' approval and which may not reduce the
fundamental rights and freedoms.
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Third:
A) To enact, amend and abolish laws relevant to the Region.
B) To amend the application of those federal laws that are
outside of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal
government.
C) To enact those laws relevant to the joint jurisdiction of the
Federal and Regional authorities.
Fourth: To Remove the President of the Region or his Vice
President requires a majority vote of Parliament members, which shall
occur after his accusation by the Kurdistan Constitutional Court in one of
the cases below:
A) Violation of the constitutional oath.
B) Violation of the Constitution.
C) High treason.
Fifth: To give confidence to the government and its members or to
withdraw confidence from them is performed by a majority vote of
Parliament members.
Sixth: To approve common policies of the Regional and Federal
Government.
Seventh: To monitor the activities of the Executive branch and to
question the Prime Minister, his deputy and the ministers in accordance
with law and rules of Parliament.
Eighth: To approve the annual budget of the Kurdistan Region, to
approve the final budgetary accounting, to approve reallocation of funds
from one account to another, and to approve any supplemental funds not
included in the initial budget.
Ninth: To approve public development plans.
Tenth: To impose and abolish taxes and tariffs.
Eleventh: To decide on the eligibility of Members of Parliament.
Twelfth: To adopt the bylaws and procedures of Parliament, to
determine its staffing, to establish the budget of the Parliament, to choose
a Parliamentary staff and their compensations.
Thirteenth: To create temporary, permanent and investigative
committees as necessary.
ARTICLE 94:
The Parliament shall not relinquish its legislative powers except as
provided in Part Seven of Article 104 in this Constitution.
ARTICLE 95:
First: The Parliament Member has parliamentary immunity and he
is free to talk within the limits stated in the Parliament's Bylaw.
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Second: The Parliament Member's freedom may not be restricted
nor may he be watched without the Parliament's approval.
Third: The Parliament Member may not be Pursued or interrogated
or inspected personally or his home personally or his home or office or
arrested by any side, whatsoever, when the session is ongoing without
the consent of the Parliament except when he is caught red-handed with a
serious crime.
Fourth: The Parliament Member may not be pursued or
interrogated or inspected personally or his home of office or arrested
when the session is not ongoing without the consent of his president
except when he is caught red-handed with a serious crime and he shall
inform the Parliament of what measures were taken against him once the
Parliament resumes its session.
ARTICLE 96:
First: the Parliament may disengage itself on obtaining the consent
of a majority of two- thirds of the number of the Members.
Second: The Parliament is disengaged by a decree released by the
President of the Region in the following circumstances:
(1) The resignation of more than half of its Members.
(2) If quorum for its convening has not been attained within
forty-five days starting from the date of summoning it for
convening to begin its electoral session.
(3) Not rendering confidence for three various successive
proposed ministerial formations.
Third: A decree shall be released for the elections of Kurdistan
Parliament within fifteen days from the date of its disengagement and
through the period of two months before the deadline of electoral
session.
ARTICLE 97:
In case the Parliament has been disengaged or the end of its
electoral session, new elections shall be conducted for electing a new
Parliament within a maximum period of sixty days from the date of its
disengagement or within the two months before the end of the electoral
session.
ARTICLE 98:
If the period of the Parliament's session ended and due to war or
natural disasters, new elections could not be carried out, the Parliament
should go on its duties, until new elections are conducted and it holds its
first session.
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PART TWO
The Executive Authority
First: The President of Kurdistan Region
ARTICLE 99:
First: The Region has its own President called (President of
Kurdistan Region) and he is the Supreme President of the Executive
Authority and the General Leader of the Peshmerga (Region's Guard).
He represents the Region's people and replaces it on the national and
patriotic occasions and he manages co-ordination between the Federal
Authorities and the Region's Authorities.
Second: The President shall have a Deputy who assists him in his
duties and replaces him in his absence and he shall be the Deputy of the
General Leader of the Peshmerga.
ARTICLE 100:
The President shall be elected through casting a public direct secret
ballot by the Region's populations.
ARTICLE 101:
The method how the Kurdistan Region's President is elected, the
stipulations of electing him, how he is accused, tried and the terminations
of his period of rule, are specified in accordance with a law.
ARTICLE 102:
The Region's President shall take the following constitutional oath
in front of Kurdistan Parliament-Iraq prior to his taking over his task:
(I swear by Almighty God to preserve the rights, the gains, the unity
and the interests of Kurdistan Region's people and to practice my
commission honestly and sincerely and to adhere to the Kurdistan-Iraq
Constitutions).
ARTICLE 103:
The period of rule of Kurdistan Region's President shall be four
years and he may be re-elected for a second reign.
ARTICLE 104:
The Region's President shall practice the following authorities:
First: Proposing the law projects and the resolutions of Kurdistan
Parliament-Iraq.
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Second: Releasing the laws and the resolutions that Iraqi Kurdistan
Region Parliament has enacted within ten days as of the date of receiving
them by the Presidency Divan and he is entitled to object them entirely
or partially and return them to the Parliament for reviewing and the
Parliament's resolution on them shall be decisive and they shall be
deemed ratified in case they have not been released within the mentioned
period of time.
Third: Releasing a decree on conducting the public Elections of
Kurdistan Parliament-Iraq on its disengagement, or the termination of its
electoral session's period of time as per Article(96) of this Constitution
taking into consideration the periods of time specified in Articles ( 96
and 97) of the constitution.
Fourth: Releasing a decree for summoning the Kurdish Parliament
to the first convening session of the electoral session within fifteen days
as of the date of announcing the final results and if it has not been
summoned , the Parliament, by itself, will convene the next day after the
termination of the mentioned period of time.
Fifth: Disengaging the Kurdistan Parliament-Iraq shall be by a
decree in the circumstances referred to in this Constitution or Kurdistan
Parliament Law.
Sixth: Deposing a Minister as per a proposal from the Prime
Minster.
Seventh: Releasing decrees having equal influences of Laws after
negotiating and agreement with the President of the Parliament and the
Region's Council of Ministers in case the Kurdistan Region, its political
system or its public security or its constitutional establishments face a
sudden danger which threatens its existence and it was difficult to the
Parliament to convene, provided that those decrees be displayed to the
Parliament on its first session that follows. If they have not been
displayed to the Parliament but it did not approve them, they will lose
their legal feature.
Eighth: Granting a specific amnesty for the convicted in accordance
with the Law.
Ninth: Ratifying the death sentences or minimizing them to life
sentences.
Tenth: Announcing a state of emergency during warfare of
occupation or rebellion or anarchy or natural disasters or an outbreak of
diseases or any other emergency cases provided that the first period of
time does not exceed one month and the later extensions should be
applied on the absolute approval of majority or the Members of the
Parliament and for a period of time not exceeding three months for every
extension and the laws regarding states of emergency shall be organized
in accordance with a Law.
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Eleventh: Summoning, exceptionally, the Ministers' Council for
convening, when necessary, and discussing the defined matters for which
the convention is arranged and he (i.e. the President) shall chair the
convention.
Twelfth: Permitting Federal Armed Forces or any other Military
Units to enter the Region, when necessary by the approval of Kurdistan
Parliament-Iraq provided that they specify their mission, place and the
time and duration of their existing.
Thirteen: The Region's President is entitled to dispatch Peshmarga
Forces (Region's Guard) outside the Internal Security Forces outside the
Region by the approval of the Parliament of Kurdistan -Iraq.
Fourteenth:
a- Ordering the Parliament Faction Nominee with the
majority in number, to form the Cabinet within the period
of thirteen days as from the day when he had been ordered.
b- The President orders another nominee of the same bloc to
form the Cabinet if the first nominee failed in forming it
within the period of time stated in Paragraph (1)
mentioned above.
c- If the second nominee failed in forming the cabinet, the
President of the Region is entitled to select another person
whom he finds proper and the President orders him to form
the Cabinet.
d- The person who has been ordered to form the Cabinet may
be either one of the Members of the Parliament or others.
Fifteenth: Releasing a decree on accepting the resignation of the
Cabinet of the Ministers or concealing confidence from either of them.
Sixteenth: Releasing a decree on accepting the resignation of the
Cabinet of the Minister and ordering them to continue their missions till
forming the new Cabinet.
Seventeenth: Releasing a decree on establishing departments
relating the Region for the cultural, social and developmental affairs in
the Iraqi Embassies and Diplomatic Missions abroad.
Eighteenth: Assigning holders of distinguished private ranks after
being nominated by the concerned Minister and the Ministerial Council's
approval.
Nineteenth: Assigning judges, the head and the members of the
general prosecution after having been nominated by the Region's Justice
Assembly.
Twentieth: Granting military ranks of Peshmarga (Region's Guard),
and the Internal Security Forces, discharging them or retiring them in
accordance with the valid applied Laws.
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Twenty-first: Awarding badges of honor and medals in accordance
with the Law.
ARTICLE 105:
The salaries and the allowances of the Region's President and his
Deputy are determined in accordance with a Law.
ARTICLE 106:
The Region's Presidency shall have a Diwan whose establishments
and duties are determined in accordance with a law.
ARTICLE 107:
First: If the President of the Region resigns, dies or has become
permanently ineffective, his successive shall be elected in the same
method which has been demonstrated in this constitution.
Second: When the post of the President of Kurdistan Region is
vacant, the President of Kurdistan Parliament shall take over his tasks till
a new President has been elected.
Third: When the President of Kurdistan Region is absent and
outside Kurdistan Region or enjoying a leave, his Deputy shall take over
his tasks.
Second: Kurdistan Region
Council of Ministers
ARTICLE 108:
The Council of Ministers of Kurdistan Region is the Executive and
Administrative Authority in the Region and it performs its tasks under
the supervision and directives of Kurdistan Region's President.
ARTICLE 109:
First: The Council of Ministers consists of the Prime Ministers, his
Deputy and the Ministers. Its formation is specified by a Law.
Second: Ordering the nominee ordered to form the Cabinet shall be
in accordance with Paragraph (Fourteen) of Article (104) in this
Constitution.
Third: The Prime Minister, who is entitled to choose his Deputy
and the Ministers, shall choose them from the Kurdistan Parliament or
others who are legitimate for Kurdistan Parliament's Membership.
Fourth: The Nominated Prime Minister, who is entitled to from the
Cabinet, shall forward the President of Kurdistan Region with a list with
the Members of his Cabinet's names for ratification.
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Fifth: Once the President of the Region has ratified the list of the
Members of the Cabinet, the entitled Prime Minister shall introduce his
Cabinet's members to the Kurdistan Parliament demanding that they be
granted confidence.
Sixth: The Prime Minster shall chair the meetings of the Council
exempting the meetings which are attended by the President of Kurdistan
Region.
ARTICLE 110:
The Prime Minster and Members of the Cabinet shall take the
following Constitutional oath in front of the Parliament after obtaining its
confidence and before starting their official duties:
(I swear by God, the Almighty, to honestly preserve the Unity of the
people and land of the Iraqi Kurdistan and to respect the Constitution, the
valid applied Laws and to, completely, keep the people's interest).
ARTICLE 111:
A fair representation of the Minorities should be represented in the
formation of the Kurdistan Region's Council of Ministers.
ARTICLE 112:
The Ministers are jointly consolidated before Kurdistan Parliament
in their responsibilities for the matters concerning the Ministers and
every Minister is, individually, responsible for the activities of his
Ministry and he is its foremost and direct person.
ARTICLE 113:
The Council of Ministers Practices the following authorities and
functions:
First: Putting into effect the Laws, Resolutions and Regulations as
well as reserving Region's Security and Public Wealth.
Second: Drawing the Region's general policy jointly with the
President of Kurdistan Region and executing them after the Parliament
has approved them.
Third: Setting up development plans' projects and implementing
them after being determined by the Parliament.
Fourth: The Kurdistan Regional Government jointly with the
Federal Government shall administer the fields of oil and gas which are
extracted from Iraqi Kurdistan's land and which are commercially
invested before 15/08/2005 provided that the revenues incurred from
them be fairly divided basing on the principles of Article (112) of the
Federal Constitution and this shall be organized as per law. The
commercial production measure for the purpose of applying this
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paragraph is to produce five thousand barrels a day throughout the past
period of twelve months before 15/08/2005.
Fifth: Kurdistan Government and the Federal Government shall
draw the strategic policies needed for developing oil of and gas wealth
provided that Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament approval is obtained.
Sixth: Kurdistan Regional Government shall take over all the
requirements of the fields of oil and gas which have not been extracted or
the extracted oil and gas which were commercially invested before
15/08/2005 in the operations of exploration, extraction, administration,
selling, marketing, exporting and so on. These operations shall be
organized according to a Law and the Commercial Production measure
for the purpose of applying this paragraph is to produce five thousand
barrels a day throughout the twelve months before 15/08/2005.
Seventh: Exercising all that has been shown in the exclusive
specialization of Federal Authorities such as the executive authorities
concerning the Region according to paragraph (110) of the Federal
Constitution.
Eighth: Exercising the joint authorities it has been empowered by
the Federal and the Region's Authorities in accordance with the
provisions of the Federal Constitution.
Ninth: Working out the Region's draft general budget
Tenth: Working out and providing the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament
with the laws and resolution.
Eleventh: Releasing the executive and administrative resolutions
according to the laws and regulations.
Twelfth: Supervising the Ministries, establishment and Public
utilities in Kurdistan Region and directing, following up and monitoring
them and coordinating with them.
Thirteenth: Appointing, promoting, discharging, segregating and
retiring the employees according to the Law in such a way not to
contradict with the law of civil the Service Council in the Region.
Fourteenth: Nominating the Region's International Security Forces
such as Police, Security and Region Guards.
ARTICLE 114:
First: The Council of Ministers is considered resigned in the
following cases:
a. When the Prime Minister resigns.
b. When the Parliament of Kurdistan withdraws its
confidence from its President
c. When a new period of rule of the Kurdistan Region- Iraq
has started
d. When a new President of Kurdistan Region has started.
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e. When the President of the Council passes away.
Second: The Minister is considered resigned if the Kurdistan
Parliament withdraws its confidence from him.
Third: The resigned Council of Ministers is regarded as a Council
for managing the duties till a new Council has been formed.
ARTICLE 115:
First: According to a law, the way how the President of the Council
of the Ministers, his Deputy and the Ministers are convicted and tried.
Second: According to a law, the salaries, the allowances and the
prerogatives of the President of the Council of Ministers, his Deputy and
his Minister are specified.
PART THREE
Judicial Power
First: General Principles
ARTICLE 116
Judiciary is independent, there is no jurisdiction on it except law.
ARTICLE 117:
Judiciary has a general rule on all natural and incorporeal persons in
Kurdistan Region.
ARTICLE 118:
The Judicial judgment and resolutions are released and executed in
the name of people.
ARTICLE 119:
The judges are not to be segregated except in the cases which the
Law allows.
ARTICLE 120:
The judge and the members of the General Prosecution are
prohibited from:
First: Clustering judicial post and the two legislative and executive
posts or any other work.
Second: Affiliation to a party or political organization or under
taking any political activity.
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ARTICLE 121:
Court hearings are open unless the court decided to make them
closed observing public discipline or ethics or for preserving a family's
honor and respect provided that the court sentences are announced in
open sessions.
ARTICLE 122:
Establishing private or exceptional courts is prohibited in the
Region.
ARTICLE 123:
A law shall organize the courts for looking into the crimes relating
to the military feature, crimes of this type committed by the Peshmarga
and Internal Security Forces as well as the crimes that occur among the
affiliates of Peshmarga Forces or Internal Security Forces.
ARTICLE 124:
First: No personal rules of a religion may be imposed on another
religion or diverting it.
Second: The followers of other non-Muslim religion and sects such
as Christian, Ezidis and so on, can establish their own spiritual
communities and practice the regulations and rituals relating their
personal status and which are specified with a law and are perceived by
the Personal Status Court.
Third: Fulfilling the valid effective rules of the laws in the Region
as regards Personal status for the non-Muslims till a law which shall
organize the provisions of their personal status, has been enacted.
ARTICLE 125:
The text in the Laws on preventing the Courts from hearing the
cases arising from them shall be prohibited.
ARTICLE 126:
The next in the Laws on immunity of any administrative action or
resolution's being appealed, shall be prohibited.
ARTICLE 127:
The Law ensures that the administration is impartial and oppressors
and in using the authority, shall be penalized.
ARTICLE 128:
Every person who is afflicted by harm due to the behavior or action
or negligence by those who are working in the government offices and
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establishment in the Region while performing their works has the right to
demand compensations from the mentioned sides.
ARTICLE 129:
The judicial provisions should be implemented and refusal or
delaying from their implementation shall be deemed a punishable offense
according to the Laws and if the accused is a main employee or has been
ordered to perform a general service, he shall be segregated from his post
as well as being punished and the accused can sue to the court directly
and the government shall guarantee him a full compensation in case of
damage.
Second: Judicial Assembly
ARTICLE 130:
The Judicial Authority in the Region is independent and it is
comprised of: Judicial Assembly, Constitutional Court of Cassation,
Consultation Council, the Judicial Supervision Board, the Public
Prosecution Board and the courts with various ranks, types and boards.
The method of its formation, stipulation and procedures for appointing
its members and interrogating them shall be according to a Law.
ARTICLE 131:
First: The Judicial Assembly is comprised of: The Head of the
Constitution Court, one of his Deputies, the Head of the Judicial
Supervision Board, the Head of the Public Prosecution and the Head of
Cassation Courts in the Region.
Second: The Judicial Assembly shall take over managing the
judiciary affairs, monitoring Judicial Board and securing its
independence according to the Law.
ARTICLE 132:
First: the Judicial Authority has its own budget annexed to the
Region's budget.
Second: The Judicial Authority shall prepare the annual Judicial
Authority's draft project and it shall forward it to the Parliament of
Kurdistan-Iraq for approval, provided that the final amount of the budget
is listed down in the Region's annual budget.
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Third: Constitutional Court
ARTICLE 133:
The Iraqi Kurdistan has a Supreme Court named (Kurdistan
Constitutional Court) and it shall be established according to a law.
ARTICLE 134:
First: the Kurdistan Constitutional Court is comprised of seven
members including the President and they shall be selected from judges,
law professors and the lawyers whose services in the judicial legislation,
teaching or legal profession altogether are not less than twenty years.
Second: Selecting the members of the Constitutional Court shall be
carried out by the Judicial Assembly and through consultation with the
President of the Kurdistan Region.
Third: Assigning the Members of the Court shall be carried out by
the President of Kurdistan Region by a decree after approval on the
nominees by the Parliament, has been obtained.
ARTICLE 135:
The Court shall elect its president from its members.
ARTICLE 136:
The President and the Members of the Constitutional and Cassation
Courts shall take the legal oath before the President of Kurdistan Region
before assuming their assignments. The other Court Judges in the
Region shall take oath before the Head of Judiciary Council.
ARTICLE 137:
The Constitutional Court is specialized in the following matters:
First: Explaining the Constitutional Texts of the Iraqi Kurdistan
Region.
Second:
a. Monitoring the constitutionality of the laws according to a
request by the President of Kurdistan Region or the
Council of the Ministers or the claim by the direct harmed
person.
b. Making the final decision on the legitimacy of the
regulations, resolutions and directives basing on a direct
claim forwarded by the harmed.
Third: Making a decision on the complaint forwarded to the Court
on the non-constitutionality of the law or a resolution or regulation or
directives. The Court trying the case should delay it till a solution is
taken on the complaint
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Fourth: Ratifying the general elections of the President of
Kurdistan and the President of Iraqi Kurdistan.
ARTICLE 138:
According to a law, the court memberships stipulations; managing
its work; how cases and claims tackled, are organized.
ARTICLE 139:
The Constitutional Court's decisions are decisive and obligatory for
everyone and if the Court-on taking a decision on the constitutionality
of the laws or the legitimacy of the regulations and directives-decided
that either of them is against the Constitution or the Law, should notify
the concerned authority in Kurdistan for taking the needed measures for
eliminating the constitutional breach or setting it right.
Fourth: Prosecution General
The Public Prosecution shall represent the community and shall
handle a public case personally defending the Public right to achieve
justice and he should do his utmost for the implementation of the
criminal laws, monitoring the affairs of judicial verification, monitoring
law breaches as well as executing the resolutions, regulations and
penalties.
Fifth: Consultation Assembly
ARTICLE 141:
According to a law Region's Consultation Assembly, which shall be
specialized with the following tasks, shall be established:
First: Having the final decisive words on the refutation relating to
the disciplinary and regulation measures and employment service issues
relating to the staff of the governmental offices.
Second: making the final decision on disputes of specialization
among the Ministries, Government Institutions and offices in the Region
basing on the Prime Minster's request.
Third: Setting up and drafting law projects in the Region on a
request by the President of the Region or Council of Ministers or the
concerned Ministers or the sides which are not related to a Ministry
Fourth: Bringing into view opinions and consultations on juristic
matters which are presented to it (i.e. the Consultation Assembly) by the
Ministries, and the sides which are not related to a Ministry as well as
making decisions in matters with different opinions among them if those
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related to the issue appealed to the Assembly and the Assembly's view
shall be obligatory to them.
CHAPTER FOUR
Local Administrations and Municipality Councils
ARTICLE 142:
The Administrative Divisions in Kurdistan Region shall be:
(Governorate, District and Sub- district). Designing them; pointing out
or changing their centers; demarcating or amending their border lines;
disjoining them and annexing them to other administrative units shall be
in accordance with the Law.
ARTICLE 143:
First: Administrative decentralization in running the administrative
units in Kurdistan Region (Governorate, District and Sub-district) shall
be adopted and each of them shall have a local assembly elected through
a direct secret public ballot. The way how it is elected and its authorities
and tasks shall be specified in accordance with a Law.
Second:
Each Administrative Unit shall have an executive
administrative council headed by the President of the administrative unit.
A Law shall indicate how it is to be formed and specify its authorities,
tasks and its relationships with the local council of the Administrative
Unit itself, the Ministries and the Central Establishment in Kurdistan
Region.
ARTICLE 144:
The centre of every Governorate, District and Sub- district, and
Village whose population is three thousand or more, shall have a
municipality managed and run by an elected municipality council which
shall take over extending public services to its citizens in accordance
with a Law.
ARTICLE 145:
First: The Local Councils and the Municipality shall have their
incorporeal personalities.
Second: Each Administrative Unit or Municipality shall have its
own independent budget.
ARTICLE 146:
In forming the Local and Municipality Council a fair representation
of the nationals, existing within the administrative Unit or Municipality,
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should be taken into consideration. This shall be arranged in accordance
with a law
CHAPTER FIVE
Independent Institutions and Commissions
ARTICLE 147:
First: In accordance with Law the following are established:
A. The Supreme Independent Institution for Elections and
Polling in Kurdistan Region.
B. Civil Services Council.
C. Auditory Accounts' Diwan.
D. Public Integrity Institution.
E. Commission of the People's Right Protection.
F. Commission Concerned with Faylien Kurd's rights.
G. The Public Board for the Safety and good Quality of the
Local and Imported Products.
H. Independent Kurdistan's Board for Media and
Communications.
Second: In accordance with a Law the Following are established:
A. Consultancy Assembly for the Economic and Social
Affairs
B. The task of the Assembly shall be to offer the consultancy
in the economic and social affairs for Kurdistan Region
Presidency, Kurdistan Parliament- Iraq and the Council of
Ministers' affairs.
ARTICLE 148:
The Commissions and the Institutions stated in Article (147) shall
be subject to monitoring by Kurdistan National Assembly in Accordance
with the Law.
CHAPTER SIX
Financial Provisions
ARTICLE 149:
First: No taxes or dues may be imposed or amended or cancelled
and no one is exempted from paying them and no one may be ordered to
pay other taxations unless Law permits.
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Second: People with low incomes are excused from paying taxes in
such a manner to secure them the minimum fair livelihood and this shall
be organized by a Law.
ARTICLE 150:
The Kurdistan Region's Revenue are as follows:
First: Taxes, dues, public utilities services, charges, incomes from
establishments, firms, public interest in the Region and what has been
received as administration expenditure, tax collection, custom dues and
other federal incomes in the Region.
Second: Incomes received from investing the natural resources in
the Region.
Third: Grants and Presents.
Fourth: The internal and external loans related to Kurdistan
Region.
Fifth: The Region's shares from the oil and gas wealth, custom
dues and the other Federal incomes.
ARTICLE 151:
The Fiscal year shall be specified in accordance with a Law.
ARTICLE 152:
First: Every fiscal year Kurdistan Region Budget's Law shall be
enacted and it shall include the estimated incomes and expenditure.
Second: The draft budget of the fiscal year shall be forwarded to
the Parliament of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region , three months before the
end of the fiscal year.
Third: In case of delay in arranging or forwarding the budget at the
start of the year for any reason, whatsoever, Kurdistan Government shall
adopt spending a ratio of one-twelfth of the previous determined Fiscal
Year's approbations for each month's delay in forwarding the budget
CHAPTER SEVEN
The Final Provisions
ARTICLE 153:
The President of the Region, the President of the Iraqi Kurdistan
Parliament, the Members of the Parliament, the Prime Minister and his
Deputy, the Ministers, the Judges, the Public Prosecutors and their
Deputies, Persons with Special Ranks, the Director Generals and those of
their ranks, are prohibited from buying or renting any public possessions
in the Region or renting or selling their properties to the Region
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Authorities or entering a contact directly or thorough a mediator for
being committed or as importers or contractors.
ARTICLE 154:
No other Constitutional or Federal Law Text that discredits the
authorities of Kurdistan Region-Iraq and which are not included within
the specific specializations of the Federal Authorities is valid unless the
Kurdistan Region's approval and the consent of Kurdistan Region's
people on it through a questioning win the majority voters.
ARTICLE: 155
First: It is valid on the areas of land whose ownerships have not
been settled or the lands whose settlement has not got its final degree
decision in Kurdistan Region in accordance with Article (12) of the
Agrarian Reform Law No. (117) of the year 1970 and it abolishes the
validity of the provisions of Article (8) of the Law No (90) of the year
1975.
Second: The Courts shall be specialized in hearing cases related to
compensation payability for the rightful possession of the lands which
have been seized by the government for the public interest in accordance
with the paragraph (First) mentioned above and the concerned
committees were unable to fix the rights related to them (i.e. the lands).
ARTICLE 156:
The Court of Cassation of Kurdistan Region is specialized-besides
its normal specializations-in clarifying the texts of this Constitution and
making a decision on the complaints forwarded to the Court on nonconstitution laws, resolutions, regulations and instructions on the cases
sued before the judicial authority , till the Constitutional Court is being
formed.
ARTICLE 157:
The Laws shall be published in the official Gazette (Kurdistan
Events) of the Kurdistan Region-Iraq and shall be operative as from the
date of its issuance unless it contains a contradictory text.
ARTICLE 158:
The Constitution shall be regarded as ratified after the consent of
the majority of the voters for the people of Iraqi Kurdistan on it, in a
pubic questionnaire process.
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ARTICLE 159:
First: The President of the Region and the Prime Minister jointly or
half of the number of the Parliament Members have the right to propose
this Constitution to be amended provided that the amendment should not
affect the Region's Republican, Parliamentary and Democratic System.
Second: The Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament has the right to approve the
proposal by a majority of its two-thirds of its members' votes.
Third: Questioning is the right of Kurdistan Region's citizens and
25% of those who have the right for elections in the Region to request a
questionnaire being carried out on a certain subject, provided that it is
arranged and implemented in accordance with the Law.
ARTICLE 160:
This Constitution shall be effective after sixty days as from the date
of its being approved through the public questionnaire and the President
of the Region takes upon himself the task of issuing it in the Official
Gazette (Kurdistan Events) though ten days as from the date of its being
approved in the Public Questionnaire.
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